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ii 
The primary subjeot of this thesis is Brand Blansbard's two volume 
work, .!!!! Nature .!! ThoUibt. Professor Dlanshard is 8. !*St President of 
the American Philosophical Association and is ourrently on the faculty of 
Yale UniverSity. Uia t". volumes r'Gpr •• ent the result of Uerculean of-
forta--etforts to bridge the almost impassable chasm between the various 
paychological and philosophical account. of ideas and inference. Profes. 
s ... Dlanshard approaches the august topic of thought from a broad and 
capable background, demonstrating equal abf.U.ties in the psychological 
and philosophical disciplines. He also bringa 8. rare quality of superb 
philosophical style to his chapter. and is, if .... may say so, 8. philoso-
pher'. philosopher. 
The proble. of classifying or typing Dlanshard presents meny diffi-
culties. His theory of the idea reflects a. certain similarity to that 
of Josiah Royce. In many areas of bis writings, hOQver, one sees the 
stamp of British empiricism, alongside references to Aristotle as ~11 as 
Plato. It is not easy, then, to place him absolutely within a school of 
tbought, al thougb at times he hy been termed an Ideal ist. lflt .. tever the 
meaning of the term 'idealist' is, it seems to be based on quite subtle 
grounda wben applied to Dlanshard. 
!be author of this theses has proposed to concern himself, for the 
Moat part, with the exposition of Brand Blanshard's epistemology insofar 
as it bears upon Itis coherence theory of trutb. In attempting to accom-
ill 
iT 
pllsh this taak, the author haa telt constrained, for purpos.s ot eeon~, 
to aToid long digressions into the disjecta membra ot historical opiste-
mology. SOmG reterences, for purposes of contrast a.nd comparison, wUl 
be made. nut to attempt to c..-ry on any susta.ined polemic in rega.rd to 
Dlanshard's arguments, would ca.rry us tar beyond tbe limits of this theaia. 
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THE ORIGINS OF 'fHOUGH'l' 
"From the lonst level to the highest ••• 
.... find f,eleology, not the kind that i. 
found in e%plieit thought, but something 
more generic."1 
, 
Thi. introductory chapter, along with'th. second, proposes a diffi-
cult, although nec •• sary, task. It propo ••• to set out, in rather broad, 
general "1"118, the main line of t,he &rg\1lHnt, yhiob precedes Blan.llard'. 
coherence theory of truth. ~ great deal of Blanahard'. lucid explica-
tion. and example., theretore, rill ne •••• arily ha.,.e to be skirted, how-
ever desirable their incluaion yould be. The danger presents itself then, 
ot rendering incomple"" expre •• ion to Dlan.harel's theory, and substitut-
ing in ita .tead, infinite sugg.stion--a desirable de.,.lee for poets per-
hapa, but bardly plauible In philosophy, where the .upreme duty of a 
writer, according to many, i. to present a literal mea.nin{h It is the 
intention of the author that this chapter, and the succeeding one, yill 
eontribute, eventually, to t,he digestion of what tollOW's it" rather tban 
IDrand Dlanshard, "The Nature of lUnd," !!!!. Jottrna:l .2! Philosopq, 
38, (April 1941), 110. 1 
I 
Dlan.hard-. The Ntt.ture !! Thou.st!t2 contains, in all. four booke, en-
titled respectively "Thought in Perception," "The Theory of the Idea," 
"The Movement of aerle.tion," and "The Goal of Thought." lie approaches 
hta .ubjeet on a grand 80ale J attempting to hridge the .eemingly imp688"" 
hIe chum that .eparates payeholegy and philoaophy. 'l'lumght i. not reduc-
ible to image., act., refle.a, or psychioal eventa, nor is it aUlloeptlble 
.f explanation out..ide of the psychi ... l context. In other nrd8, t.hought 
cwmot. be i80lated in .. cozy vacu_, for it i. aln.,.. maa who thinb and 
W'bo Jau'.... Ta'bn out of ita oonten, ... t. otten done in logic, psycho-
logy, or epiatemology, the nature of thoug~t. i8 done a di •• orvice • 
.A.. Tllough't in Perception 
In order, then, to achieve a.me unity coneerning the na.ture of our 
topic, one mut, clearly, explain the ground or origin of thought. Ini-
tially. Blansha.rd delimita tbougbt 0)" de,cribing it u .. • •• that activi-
ty of mind which aima direotly at tl'1lth"hlat.ure I. 51). Any activity 
which doe. not. have this atm, or ~ pro •••• that could not yield truth, 
can be ruled out. Th. question then aris.s concerning the activi'tiea tha't 
haTe such an aim. The mo.t elementary form of thought i. fOU11d in per-
ception, which ia the lowe.t type of J~nt. Truth, it ia general I)" 
admitted, ia attained in ~ judgmental act, and the .~plest type of judg-
ment is on a perceptual level-aimplelJt, becaWIJe the aftirme.tion or neg&-
- 2nnmd Dlanshard, The Nature of ThoUS'ht, in tw volumes, (London, 
1939). ~lose volumes Yill1bencelort~e ftnown as Nature. 
t.ion on the perceptual level :Ut indeed a. very indetermina.te act. 
Perception, admittedly, is one of the {(Dottieat problema of metaphy-
sics and epistemology, but Blanahard •• atudy ia not ao much of perception 
u it is of the emergence ·of t.hought in and through it.. We are interested, 
then, not ao much in the aigns along the road, u ". are in the cl •• tination 
to .. thieh they le84. One of thea. aigna is perception, cODCIenling wich 
tbere are tour maiD questions I Boy doea perceptual thought COtle int.o be-
lng' What is the ordinary struct.lU"e of perception? What are the 1 imi ta-
tions of perception? How i. the traasition trom perception to tree ideas 
ma.4.,a 
'10 diacWila the origin and mechanica ot P8nept.ion, we may initiall,. 
define pGrception as .. ••• that espert.nee in whioht on tbe warrant of 
somethiag given in sensa.tion a.t the time, we unreflectingl,. take aome ob-
ject to be before us" (Katv,,!. I. 61) 'fhia ia beyond mere .ensa.tion, but 
ne".rthele .. still in the lUlrefle.ting stage. It ia the roa.cl bet_en mere 
"ruta"'on and 'spli.it judge.nt.. But to S&7 jut. preoisely when ~reep­
toiOB.· ..... on the ••• n. 'a quit.e cliffieult. Perception, one thinka, in-
TOl".. experie.e, and ft muat. not confuse tirs" reactiolUl with firat ex-
perienoe.. A personta tirat reactiona are not neoe.sarily fir.t experl-
en.... Nor must, we oonfua. what, 18 analyt.io .. l1,. simplest wi til 'What is 
hiat.ori ... lly firat. fhe product. of aDal,..!s are otten oont.ed with what 
1M gift. initiall,._ This _ana that what ts ginn initially riIt1 not, a.ud 
probably ia not, recognifled for what it is. Rt.ther. it ia only a.fter an 
4-
accumula.tion of' int.ervening eXperience t.hat one recognises tbe 1Ile&Bing of 
one'a first rea.et.ions, but 1:nactvert.ent.ly predicl'ites the a.oquirecl meaning 
of one 'a first. reaction. Aa Bloaahu-d stateAl 11,. "We lDlUit &v-oid re84ing 
acquired meaning. into 'Lhe esperiences ". start Yith"(Ne.t.uro I. :sa). 
Through p81Ohological es.perimenkt.lon, we can easily ahow that p0reeiving 
vari •• greatl,. with, and 1. cont.lngent. upon, previoua experienoe. We tend 
to react into the earlier ... hat comell later" But in attempting to underatan 
perception, aael to aToi4 contoun41ng it rith later exporienee, .... must 80 
ngt.rd peJ"Oeption ... to aee it in the light of thought, in Ol"der to undo 
stan. thought" In Bla.nahard'a "rU, ItWe mut 80 conatrtte the ... or1d we 
first liTe in u to make .sct\p8 from it poasiblett(lfature X. 5f). Wit.h 
this dictate confronting Uf 1N IIUIIt attempt to &'9'oid logical simples and 
Mquired meanings. 
We are interested, then, iu initiol experience, experience as it. 
occva, not experienoe u reflected upon. We way find in Jwaea a conven-
ient point ot dep&rture. The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, no •• , skin, 
l\Ild entra.ils at on •• , teela it all u one gre{"t blooming, buzing, con-
fwlion.,tt 4, The contention is ent.ert&1ned. by Bla.nsllard. tbB.t in init.ial 
experieMe no ch ..... t.rs ... a.pprehended 8011 such. n. ia not tbe absenoc 
of iutelU.gibilit,. that preTen~ such appr .. he1l.si011t but. the 14 ••• power 
to .e. in 1;hlng8 the embodiment of univerlut.la."(1fa"ture I. 61). 'fltle is not 
t.o suggest t.hot childre. are in oommunica.tion Yitll Platonic Forms. What 
it 40.a suggest is the pres.He of lmiver8als in nature, and ma,n's pro-
4Will~ James, Principles ~ PSycholo~, (New York, 1921), 488. 
gressive e.1r'8.l"eness of their existeftee. No one nuld argue. that upon hear-
ing one sOlUld. a man 1t'OUid be aware of a conwon nature. But after hearing 
the tenth or hundredth llound, a. man is able to attribut4 a eommon nature 
to eaoh one. NOW' as Dlanahard saYII, "There is no reuon to think that 
it only then began t.o exiat. What has a hiatol")" ia not it but our per-
-
ceiving of it*(N'a.ture I. 68). Thia theory suggest. that n are not atrand 
ed on the sea of impressions alone, that e&eh impres.ion does, or ia ca~ 
ble of. ta.ldng ua beyond them. Univeraals are present in the lowat atage 
of thought--pereeptionl "If it is intolerable to say that the child is 
senate; a universal. then wo mast deny tha~ tbere haa ever been a time 
when be YU eonlined. to fl'lere sonaationa. Wha.t mat not be done is to a,. 
that n begia nth the sensing 01 bare particulara in which nothing la 
identical "ith uyt,hing .1ae, and tllat w ... hOY lind identitie. as W'8 
go on. Ident,ltl.a that are not there oa.nnot be found. We .ball not, argue 
thiIJ matw .... beoau.e one of the decisive batrUes of modern philosophy was 
fought over it·( .... t,ure I. 68). 
But to aay that univeraals are pre.ent from the start is quite differ 
ent from saying they are what YO first know. that they are historically 
firat. A child is confronted, initially, with sounds. smella, pains, al-
though in a j1lllb1.. The chUd does not perceive loudness aa loudnesa. or 
sound as sound. In other '!fOrds, alf,hough a s0un4 and a pain may be diffe 
eat, th.,.. are not, for th.t matter, distinguished. One mut first be able 
to J'Greeift aomething .!! 1;hia or that,. aa a.!!!!!. "Distinctnes. of char-
acters from each other and the us. of univer8als have their beginning to-
gethertf <!'tur. I. 64). The word distinctness i. important in regard to 
6 
lat.el'" implica.tion. concerning the total fl"'wl'levorr, of thought. "To be tor 
-
thought. at all i. to be distinct, &n4 to be 41.tinct i. to be related to 
something else through space, time, degree, or otbeJ'Yis'h And this soote-
t.hing else in turn receift. and malnto.ina it. clta.ract.er fol" thought only 
through diattnetion from the fir.t t.hlng'f(lfa.ture I. SIS}'; Thi. rill later 
1 • 
imply that thought invol"., of neoessity, .. syatemo.t.ie .hvacte ........ ca-
bereD:t, .,..tem. "Abstrut thought, in the sense of deal ing wi tit uy cha.rac-
tel" quite alone ud apart ia !lot only an impossibility, it ia a self-con-
tra.diction"(Jf&tW"'G' t. 16). 
But how, one may uk, dM. OIle leo.ve th~ bU.lal bog of pl'lmitin 1 ..... 
ttlstinetn. •• ' We may .ummarise the three chief tactors which Blanshard 
dotail.. Firat, there i. & noticeable difterenc. in the toroe or luten-
.ity with which •• uat-ions are flung upon _. It i. uuUy t,he ririd 
.enaat,icma t,ho;t. are more likel,. to make aD iatres.iOll 01l a, &net hene. 
prod ... di.tinctiYOn.... A aeoond ractor i. the obvious inter •• t. whloh 
.... seuatiou exhibit. But whe. it comes to the -l of this favoritism 
among sen.a.t.lona, we may neftI" Jmow--unle •• ft resort to such 'WOrds aa 
na.t.ure, preference. or instinct,. But. they et.Ul tail to dbeharge aD 
aD"""r "ith ftIl univocttl meauing. We can .imply 1"OO0rd interest u a de 
-
ta.ct.o cont.ribut.or. A t.hir. f&eto)" which helps to brea.k up the initiAl 
continuum &net hring quelltie. into reliet i. an ettu0,11,.. mysterious acrtivi-
ty of the mind generall,. called taasociatlon'--a 'oct.rine which indeed 
haa a long hi.tory to which the author does not Yi.h to contribut,e. 
These are, briefly, the characters of the initial experience with 
which thought ata.rt,s, and t.he main factors which bring 80me ele1l1Onts iuto 
'I 
prominence ed hence contribute t.o perception. 
we ahould atate again that t.he end of Blanahard'a whole argument. i. 
to deaeribe the goal of t.hought. But. if the goal of t.hought. ia truth, nat 
la trut.h? We oannot. ant.icipate the unfolding of truth which will come lat-
er. But in order to gift a glimmer of Blanaha.rdt • goal Ye rill quow DIan-
aharet t • cnrn anticipa.t.imu "It li.a, we aball hold, in a,.atem, and ab ..... 
all in that perfect type of aystem, in which each tomponent. ~li.s and is 
blplied by en...,. .\her. .. shall speak ... timea u if the aim .f thought 
nre underatandiJt.g, ad idlia .. lao i. true, the tn abut are equiw.lent to . 
. . 
each other. '0 knOY tIM truth about anytlaial i. t 80 far, to apprehenel it 
~ , 
in a .,-stem of relatiou that make_ it inteIU.glble, anel this 1.8 'What. ... 
mean b,. lUlderatandiDg it, .. (~at1ll". t. '18). 
fhi. 18 ment.ioned in par\ial justification .f Blanshard's aelect.ion 
of .ome .lement.. of perception rather t.haa others. Ito y1811ea t. ne... per-
eept.ion as t.lte firat. .tage in .. aeri.a of stag.. leading t.o t.ruth. That 
'riah, obvioul,., "il1 eon.id .... alll,. narrow hia tr ... taent of percept,lon. 
Baving e.tabliahed that perception ia the first atage of thought, 
aDd 1ri~t ita nature ia in origin, Blanahard then pas... to a conaideration 
ot a. knotty problem conoerning, f01" example, how ft ptWIa to the percep1iion 
of a t.h!!a em tIle "\t'3ITa.;o:t of certain given sensat.ioD.8. Thi. quest.ion is 
bued on the fact tltat " ••• there really is ill. the peroeption of thbga 
something that goes beyond •• ua.tion ...... (Natve I. 81). In answering 
this quelt.ioa, BIAnlhard, in ahort order, dt.pOsas of the behavioristic 
8 
answer that a conditioned reflex occurs, or that there ia a aupplementa-
tion hy images. It inTOl'veS, on the contra.ry, a procesa of inference wieh 
must 1'1 .... be treated. This proce.a of inference, Dlan.bard bolda, i. some-
thing It ... like a judgement or belief ... "(Nature I. 112). There is a:a 
implicit element in inference that is rather difficult to define hut clear-
17 eapu.ble of deacription. It ia akin to tbe way in Ylliell It ••• an old 
sailor bon implicitly when a. ato ... ts approaching. or ,... nen one haa 
irapliCit grouno fer thtnJdng so-an4-eo untrustworthy. In such cues there 
is pretty olearl,. aomething preaent in experience 1I'hicla aervea &8 groun4. 
Hen though it may be wry 4ifficult for the .:twlge ... to aa.y 1f'hat it la. 
One may be .......... of something &11d use it as .. ground without aingling it 
out for full &Jld apeclfie ati.ention"(Nature I. 66). 
Tbia ~~li.a the preaenc. of belief. As such, it ia rather tndofina-
ble. Jamea aa,... for example. tbat belief 11 .... t. pertectly distinct, 
hut perfectly tndescribable in words," that It ... tt teels like itself-
and that is about as much as ft cu say _,,6 Dlanshard agrees that belief 
11 connected 'With .eatre and fe.ling but YOuld not care to identify belief 
with f.eling, desire, or tbe influence of an i4.a on conduot. ttThe com-
mon difficulty .f a.ll auch vie.... 'S that they make judge_n,*, or beli.f too 
specific a function, wh.re ... the tact is that it is Tirtually identical 
with mind on ita intellectual 8ide"(Jrature I. 115). Beli.ef, tben, is of 
an intellectual nature, albeit of a general nature and, perbapll, ind.fi ..... 
b1e, This is not to saYt howyer, that it is vague and mysterious. Whet 
Swil1iam Jamu, Psl!bo10Q'. (Ney 'fork, 1892), 284-286. 
it implies for Dlanshard is that a low form of thought is present-- and 
any lor form of thought is of its nature less explicit than it might be. 
The above anal,.Sis sometrbat echoes the EmpiriCist method of writing 
& hi.tory of mental experience-that " ••• historica.l, plain method ••• "6 
of Locke. In his analysis of subatanee, to tdee one illetance, Blanaha.rd 
finda 'bhat the distinction between things an4 attributes is Dot a. distinc-
tion between attributes on the one a14e and some occult substratum on the 
other. Rathel', it is a differenee ktween attributes or characters taken 
se.erally and the same attributes or characters grouped together for sp&-
cial purposes or causes. Therefore, the concept of subatanee resolves, 
. . 
upon analysi.. not J.:nto a thing or Gill!!. but into nothing but a purpose 
or end. Subst.ance, like esseno., is a teleologiea.l oono.pt. The ... is .. 
similar1ty, in this instance, between Dlan.hard and the empirioist., but 
there are &1 •• major differences. ~le differeno. which essentially divides 
Blanshard from Locke, Berkeley, and HUIl1e, presents itself in the form of 
Dlanshard t • pOSition on the relation of the idea and image. ~le empiri-
ciats usually identified the image and the idea. Blanshard, on tbe con-
trary, maintains that iua. and :tmage f.t.l"it not the same in most cases I Ttl. 
" ••• image 40es supply the stuff of thought, but the theory that yould 
identify them g.-eral1y ia riddled with confusions and difficulties •••• 
If the thought of '" thing yere the image of it, the charactera of the one 
'If'Ould vt.ry' rith the characters of the other. But. in faet their variations 
, 
/ 6Jolm Locke, An E88az CODe_mins. nmaa.rt tJnderatudi!l, (Chicftogo, 
1936), 14. - . 
10 
(\0 not even remotely correspond. (1) 1':.e thought often gr01rs better a.s 
tho image dies awn.y, a.nd (2) when the imtjo is most perfect, the thouaht 
ma.y bo most inadequa.te. ••• Tue combined ingenuity of Locko t Berr£oloy, 
!'Mld Uume could not save the image tbeory from ba.nItruptcY"(:.a:a.ture I. e60). 
Therefore, wbile one may notre a. general similarity in oot!lodology between 
IHa.nshard and the empiricists, they a.re neverthele.8 poles apart on the 
crucial issue of tile relation of lde& and il:l8.ge. Dttt more about tha.t rill 
appeo.r la.ter ill discuaaion of tIle "'beory of the idea. 
O!lce it is aeen, hovever, t.llato there is an implicit. inferentia.l ele-
ment :in perception, YO may next consider, briefly, the nature ot perceI)tue.l 
. 
meaning, or otherwise stated, attempt to give some account of the non-aen-
sible olement involved in perception. This non-aensible elel'llOnt ( the 
implicit inferenoe) ia not a bodily motion or a physioa.l-cbernlcal cbange 
in tbe brain, because to peroeive is to judge • .f Another altornative would 
bo that pereeptun,l meaning eonsisted in .ubconsciousne"., whi-th, Bla.nslu.V'd 
S thinks, lacka merlt becCt.UlJe devoid of prool. What Dlanshard docs a.ttri-
bute merit to, is a doctrine the g~nt8 of whioh F.n. nradloy gradually 
slipped into-the doctrine of dlsposi1,i0118. Drierly, the doctrine sup-
porta the view tha.t there are psychica.l dispositions wbose natllre iii 1Mral 
8n '1'0 sa.y that everything tho declaration of 1f'I.l.r me&"lS for the sta.tcs 
1"Wl, everything 1thich, it labol"loualy put down in words, he would recog-
nize that it bad nea.nt in the moment of bea.ring-to sa.y that all this is 
actually present in consci':)'usBess soems a.bsurd. To say 011 tbe other br"ud 
tha.t tho greater part of this moaning is ~roly a bodily reaction seems 
equally absurd. To sQ.y tha.t it is pr:rycilieal 'but Unconscious seOtl8 to be 
tlsine; words witb no clear sonse." l'{,a.ture, I, 182. 
g 
~tno"ing. 
11 
Now this doctrino ot dispositions (MId. t.o Dlansh&l'd's theory of per-
ception. We have said previotts1y that perception involves 0. process ot 
implicit inference tlll·0ugh which "IfG p&ss from a mere sensation to the 
thought of something filtferent, (\nd tht\t n..."ly scnsa.tion is the beginning 
stage of thought, by which though't may ta!;c many directions wblcb are de-
·ternined by intoJ"elt. "'!'be geologist dra.n on his experience different.ly 
when as a soientist he oX3mines a stone and when he soizos it for " rnie-
si1e ••• tt(~ature I. 181). Secondly, we may note that the mind is eoon&-
l'.1ica.l of consciouanesa-resistlng moro conscious effort than it needs for 
, 
any po.rtlcular purpose. Thin lay of pe.rsimony of intelligonce hardly needs 
M"gument in its defense. It r;;ao.y be merely noted. But besides these prin-
oip1es, Dlansha.rd feel. that one must SUP,Ol!!lO agencies at YGrI, wbieh co-
operate with eo:aaciolUln •• s from outsido its flelch '1'he truth is tha.t e.pe.ri. 
from dispositions it ."ould be u iapossible for us to interprot 8. page Gf 
print o.s it would be for the poet to write his sonnot. What is n.otua.1ly 
there in our oonsciousness l'llt\y be very little, bu.t tha.t little is m4de 
what it. is by being a. conatitueut ill a system of meMing wioh, tho'l.lgh 
present for the most r~t only in ~l. form of dispositions, is ready to 
bo HL11.de eonaci()us o.t our need"(Ut\ture I. 189). There is, then, 0. co-oper 
tion bet .... en tIte non-couacious Md tbe co:u8oiotls sides of our nature. 
nature of imoYing involves more tban na.t is. present in consciousness 
aince many non-conscious forcos, whe;t Hla.nsherd calls disl19s1tioJla,a.re a.t 
18 
York, preCisely because they haTe voted the enterprise of a particular 
intereat and bave submitted a platform on which to proceed. HOW' do 'ft 
knOW' they e:dat? All YO can aay, perhaps, i. that 80 many.!'. are !m01t'D 
to exist from eerta1n activities that we do esperience. They are tactor. 
in a teleological program.IO 
Now this discussion of tdispositions' certainly does not imitate aD 
empiricist approach at all. It aee .. , on the contrary, to be reverting 
to Aristotle t.. t,heory of the powntial--a doctrine Ybieh would not find 
much sympathy, no doubt., with a Loob or a. Rum.e. However, the rejection 
of this doctrine of dispositions may be an easier task than to offer a po 
, 
itlve contribution which equally esplaina the ground, i.e., yhich equally 
expla.irut the de futo variety of .. espona.s to identical atba:tU .• 
-
c. The Struetu.re of Perceptual Meaning 
We may next eonsider, briefly, the structure of perc.ptual meaning, 
'"using our a.ttention on depth and range. Dlan.hard means by depth a 
cumulative procesa which involve. a. growing fund of meaning-a. depth of 
meaning which ia causod by a continuing lntereat--elther congenital or 
acquired. hut in either ellS. involving lengtb and repetition of experi-
ence.. l.toat important, howTer I is what gives point to the effori wich 
'the perceiving of sOllll8ttting new requires. Dlanshard, e.a 1l8u&1, sn.yaIJ there 
ia a. teleologioal force at 'WOl"k-tlamely an end or a luting purpose. NOW' 
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a more cOMplete justification of this interest or teleological force seetns 
to b. wa.nting. At most, all Bl8rWlhard does is to record the de facto pre-
- . 
seace of interest without offering .a.ny explooatioB for its presence or ita 
cause. Perha.pa it is unexplainable. But more important than that is the 
integral character this inter.st must po.ss.ss. fbi., Bla.nshard argue., 
is ..... the desire to undenknd ... "(lfa.ture I. 222), something quite 
different from a desultory gene .... l interest. 'fo understaud i. to "isb to 
... thing. in .... lation eme t.o another, to .... :lmilate, wba.t we ma.y call co 
tinuit,. of interest. But to say that underat.aBding ia what percept.ion is-
suea into is to I.ross a yet distant bridge. Understanding is t.he goal, 
. 
but by no meana reached on the percept,ua.l level. 
Let WI explain. Before understanding is possible, or before anye»-
plicit reasoning or aeeing one thing in relation to many other things is 
possibl., both perceptual depth (a repeated and grOYing tund of meaning) 
and range is nece.sary. This range of perception i. just an expansion of 
on. t • horizona, a more thorough coverage of the world. NOW' this cumulati 
dep1J1 andexteuift range of perceptual experience is the indispensable 
condi tion for reflection and henee tor undel".tand::lDg. ftis is to .a7 t.ha.t 
berore one C8Il constructively refle.t in any field or knOYledge, one must 
fir.t acquire some knowledge upon which to refl.ct, an4 in order to refl .. 
more or better, one must have men tm .... led.g.. Nft, depending upon t.he 
amount of knGWl~dg. one haa in a given field, one's reflection Yill be, 
to that degr.e, more or Ie •• limited. Thi. means that one's abilltl to 
reflect rill be more or Ie •• limitod. It fol10ys, ttton, tho.t according 
a.a one t8 abUit,. to reflect I. limited, one'. understanding (ill any po.r-
14 
ticular tle14) will be correspondingly limited. We must therefore say 
that perception leads to understanding, but only by a circuitous route. 
perceptlon ItIlUIt haft !eE~h .!:!!! ranI! as the conditions for leading to re-
flectton and understanding. In ta.ct, perception does go deep Ntd ride, 
because the goal It ia seeking ~ understandtng--a distant goal, but neve 
theless the goal. We ha ...... by no met\IUJ reache4 that goa.l, but we mention 
it in partial juatitication .r Blanshard'. contention that perception is 
guided in it. expa.:nsion by .. goal. 
It the above i. true, then one inuadiate implica.tion is that each 
man'. understanding ts delimited by tl.e degree ot :Integration nth which 
, 
he ia satistied, or according to th6 amount ot paat experienee which con-
atitute. the mnemic maaa us.d in perceptual judgments. II Thi. re.nge ot 
perceptual intelligen.e Y'M'ie., not only from man to man, but from animal 
to aatmo.l. "V •• t animals .pen4 all their 11 .... , and all men most ot their 
lifts, upon ita level"Qiat.ure I. lao). Nov the que.tion arise. concerning 
the way in Which the chasm from perception to reflect.ion and understanding 
ia spanaed. In other words, given t.he fact t.h~t both tmlma.la and men have 
perceptual experiences, hoy ia it tho.t men are able to escape trom this 
level? ?hia leada us into ~he theory of the ide~lat Blanahard calls 
the free idea. neaching the free idea mark. the escape into a larger 
realm and constitutes the link that. speeda intelligence toward ita goal of 
UDderatanding. Dut before discussing the i .... , 1i'8 may first indicate the 
value of the free Idea and its crucial importance by citing the limit&-
llIbid., It 132. 
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tions O'f perceptual thought. 
In other nrds, perceptual thought, as structured by depth e.nd yide 
ra.nge, is eonaiderably handicapped without the idea. 'f~ir8t. perceptual 
thought is tied to sens&ti~, and therefore is dependent upon the offerings 
O'f tbe P.Dment. lfitll0ut the promptings of tile mon.ut, from 'What Ortega. y 
Gasset calls the "other,"18 one cannot perform ~T purposive action. This 
occur. because there s.. no place, nth mere perception alone, in W'hich one 
could take .. stand. 'l"here 1. no mtdnland-juat 1I!Ila.nds a.t ae& 'W'bieh peri-
odically come within one'. purriey of aen.&tion. Secondly. perceptual ' 
thought is not ca.pable of abstra.cting. 18 We CQll dray upon abunda.ut evi-
dence from the antmal kingdom to substantiate this claim. lack of science, 
civili1lation, language, symbols, and (\lsue!1y) no learni:Dg through experi-
ence, testify to 1.110 lack of abstractive pon". Lastly, perceptual 
thought i. rather helpless in dealing yit& the novel. Investigationa in 
animal PSychO'Iogy14 shOY that animals lack the capacity for analYSi.,I& 
168. 
l~ature, I, 231. 
14s~epa.rticula.rl,. Kohler, .TI!!. ltento.litI .!! AI!!.. 
I 
l&"tt must doal yith things aa 'Whole.; it ca.."1not break the sitoo-
tioD into parts, eliminate those that are irrelevant and confine itself to 
the others. Of cOUl'se, stupidity the same in kind a.ppears O'ften enough 
among men, witno.s the child lost in the 'Woods, tone hOW!le'olcler "ho arrive 
Dot home rithout his key, the bystander wbo is o&11ed on to belp in cue of 
accident, or the person "ho must lIDexpectedly deal with a drunken mtm O'r a 
a burg18.l'.... Wllere t.bere is real stupidity, it OO'nsists :in the s&me de-
fect that m&r~s the ~tmal mind 80 helpless, the inability to break the 
situation into its parts, prompt.ly isolating the novel &nd allOYing this 
to develop ita special suggestions." Nature, I, 254. 
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1rllicb is really caused by ~he second defoct, the inability to ab.trQC~. 
But o:nc~~ we bave arrived &t the apex of perceptua,l ability, one finda 
a heated s~J"11ggle to achieve the tree idea. It the escape is made, it 18, 
aa Dlanahard says, " ••• very plainly a translation into a larger 'World" 
(Nature I. 1M). This larger yorld nat all the time, being prepe.red for 
ewn in the most elemeatal stag.s of perception. It is, as Blanshard ar-
gues, the very goal of percept;ioa, a. ,oal "hich is inevitably achieved if 
only the right conditions are favorable. We now ~urn to the task of espii 
eating the structure of that larger 'fIOr14, as aeen through the eyes of 
Brand Blan.hard. 
ClU.Pl'ER II 
TnE 'l'IIEORY OF TYtE IDEA 
"And when mind i. present, 
it i. present prec ise 11' in 
the degree to which minda 
aH in control." 
A. The Pree Idea 
The posses. ion of the free idea 1s a.n obvious advancement. oVer the ' 
peroeptual abilities of animals and men. It i. characterized by the abili-
t.y to look behind and forward, no longer a.ttacbed nth what is only .ense-
bound. HOY are ft t.o delimit nat i8 meant by a. tree idea.? "We are ulng 
a. tree idea whenever .. think e:splicitly of whAt is not at the momentgiftll 
u in ••• e"(Nature I. a51). The important yord Is e!Elicit. For although 
t.here is. inperoeption. a. reference t.o what is ab.ent, it is implicit--an 
. a 
implicit reference or inferenoe as we sta.ted be tore • Btd. it is precis.ly 
the explicit .. eferenoe which dl$.inguishes a. free idea from perception, 
and secondly, t.he independent. nature of the free idea in relation to what 
is given at the time in .ensatlon.8 
lBla.tlSha.rd, "The Nat.UH of Mind," 108-209. 
2sum=a, p.6. 
~o.t.ure, I, 258. 
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After such delimitation ot the free idea, our second question concern. 
ita na.t.l.I.I'e. In explaining the natve of explicit thought, Blanshard ...... pa 1 
I
, 
across, in rapid but thorough succ •• sion, the major bist.orica.l vie .... , not 
fun,.ver, in an entirely negat.ive yay- ITe considers, re.pectively, th. 
image t.heory, Bertrand Rus.ell'. theory of meaning, Behaviorism. Pra.gma.-
tiam., the thoroughgo1.ng' realism of Frans Brent&no and G.E. Moore. Santa.yan 
a'. Critical Rt!taliam, and finally, Bradley's theory ot lde&8 in Logic and 
in Psychology. Obviously, it is impossible to give a fair hearing to .ach 
one of these positiona,4 not.Yithout stra.ying tar a.tield. Blanabard' •• 
vey, bowever, haa not been entirely truitles., for each one of the above 
, 
school. of \bought. haa provided Dlanshard with a contribution which be em-
ploya tor his own tbeo17_ Indeed, t..g.s (Locke and nume) contribute hea.-
v:Uy to the content of thought. But tor that matter, .... 'Would not care to 
identii~ the tyO_ The same may be said tor yords (nus •• ll). As regards 
Behaviorism one yould certainly have to agree ~la.t the shitts and changes 
of mental life haft conditione b the body.3 Pre.gmat.iam states, and over-
state., Bla.uhard hold., that thought ia .. tool for action. "rhougbt may 
nIl be an end-aeeJdng activity, whoae go&l, if we could but find it, YOUl 
throw a tlood .f light on th4t proc ••••• of .eeking it ... "(,atve I. 411). 
nut to identtty thought with acttoa .eaus a bit preCipitant. 
" . ~~4.f It chapters 1-13. 
S l!!.!!., It 471 ...... 71. 
, 
i,1 
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We are, indeed, faeed with many alternatives in trying to sift out 
the essence of thought without contusing it with one of ita properties or 
qualiti... Perhaps BlaaJJhard points up tlle problem in a summa.ry ruhion. 
"'lbe idea. is thus an.! which must satisfy 1MB,. oonditions, positive and 
negative. Wba.t sort of t!'1ing must. that be which refers to an object, ;ret 
is not tIte object. which call. nr'tI and images in aid, yet is itself nei-
t.her object nor copy, which ohanges Yi th bodily changes, but. is more th_ 
aay bod11y change J 'Whioh i. alftys a mean. to an end, tbough not alftJ'IIJ to 
an end tbat is practical? That i. the riddle YO have to solvettOrature I • 
... 
413) • 
B. Thollght And Teleology 
The key question then become., what rill satist,. all of the.e cond:l.-
tiona at one st.rOke? Blanshard hol48 t.hat. the solut.ion lie. in the rola-
tion of the potential t. the actual, or of the unrealized to the realised. 
The theory that ho Yil1 argue in defeuse of is oontained in this rather 
lmagt,hy quotation, 
Thought in its ess.nce is an attempt to attain, in the 
sense of achieving identity wit.h, a special end ot it. own. 
The relation bet".. idea 84 ob.1o.t lII'WIt be conceived 
teleologically, as tbe relation of that which is partially 
reali'" to the ... thlBl met ... tully reali.ed. When .... 
• ay that an ide& is of an object, .... are .aylng that tbe 
ide. i. a purpo.e Yh1GDh the tbJeot &loD~ woulf fulfill' 
that it i. a pctential~t,. "I'h eli tbi. obJect a. one YOU a. 
aetuaU.se, a content infonted by an impulse to ,"come this 
object. It.. nature i. hence not tully intelligible o~ 
capt in the l1ght or what it .eeb to become. Mind, in 
taking tbougbt, a.ttempts to pa •• beyond its present esperi-
ence to what it yould be but Is not yet, _d &0 tar as it has 
tile thought of this ettd, it already !! the end E! 103:ii. 
The idea is thua both identical with it. object an -
ferent front it. It ia itientical in the sense in which any-
thing tbat truly develops i. identical with Yhat~ becomes. 
It is different in tbe sen.e in which any purpose partial-
ly realized is d1tterent trom the .ame purpose realized 
Yhol1y."(Nature I. 413) 
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This theory, the notion of idea as Wlrealized purpose, neea nOW' t.o be es-
plored with regard to ita ju.tifieatlon. It will, of GOUDe, greatly deter-
mine the courae of t.reatment cOlloe:rning the coherence theory of truth.. 
Wbat Blaa.hardhopea to aboy 11 that thfa tbeQry agrees attb wha.t we fmow 
ab01l" t,he nature of both mind Md knowledge. 
C. Teleology and the Nature o~ JUnd 
Whether the aboTe theory accords with the nature of mind depends upon 
whether mind ia interpreted in mechanical or teleological teme. It the 
tmCJ'ftr is aald to be the body J " • •• governed by tho.e mechantcB.I laws 
which hold """1' ••• then ••• thought rill har'd.l,. escape from some torm of 
determiniam"ffla.ture I. 4ft). What you hold about mind determines. 'tio a 
great extent, 'What you bold about thQught, I'md connrael,. also. Dlanahtwd 
pla.ce. bimaelt sqtt&.rel1' among those who think that mind can be" ••• es-
plained only througb the end it ia a.eking to real i.e , and that the stag.s 
of ita growth, either racial or individual, are to be understood as ateps 
in &. aelt-guided ascenttt(J!e.ture I. 416). Tbis view ia qllite similar to 
the view of Pierre Tetlhard d. Chard In in hi. fhe Phenomenon of Han • 
......".... . --..-..-. 
Jut as Bla.aabard emphasi ••• the interpreta.tion of perception teleological-
17. that it Is geared for tbe achievement of thought, reflection, and u.n-
derstanding, so too does Chardin look llpon man in terms of teleology: 
rt ••• to deoipher man is essentially to try to find out how the world was 
m&de &nd how it ought. to go on me.!dng i tae 1 f • • • • The prograane is immense 
and ita only end or aim is tha.t of the future.ttl We aigbt also mention 
ana.logous findings by Arnold Toynbee in hiatory' &nd Martin Buber in reli-
gious existentialism.8 Nevertheless, in support of his contention, DIan-
shard shows that mind is irreducibly purposive and eludes the mechanistic 
eXI.J.a.1Iation for three reasona-the pJ"oceaaes of grorih f choice, and infer-
ence. 
Firat, in t.he develop ment or grOlf'tb of the mind, there is an entire 
different. meaning at.t.ached to the ... oro grorth or developaent t.han 18 us-
u&lly signified br t.he mechanist.. What. the mechanist means by grorih is 
addition or rearra.ngemen"fi--not .. eal deftlopment. lYhereaa in mind, there 
i8 no aggrega1;e the components of which have been drawn from elsewhere. 
"It does not develop at. the expense of tha.t on 'tI'hioh it. is said metaphori-
cally to teeel .... ,,9 The lulud, u an il'Dl'l'lateria.l subject which develops, 
IPieno reila.rd de Cha.rcUn, !!!!. Phenomenon .!!.!!!., (Ne" York, 19&9), 
pp. 181-182. 
T .A.mold 'l'oynb.e, ! StudZ..!! niat.orz, (London, 1989) ~ 
'&lartin Bubel', ! and!!'!.2!t (New York, 1958). 
tn." ... Joseph, The COl1ee; of Evolution, Herbert Spenoer Lecture, 
11-13, cited in Nat.ure,I, 411:4 .-. .. 
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beara no analogy to oxamples from mechanistic evolution.IO It ia only by 
purifying ourselves of such poor analogies that we yill avoid misconceiving 
the proeefis of the growth of the mind. 
A. second consideration which points to tbe t.eleological cha.racter of 
mind concerns choice. On this score, the mechanist. say that c11oic. is a 
n ... conflict of' physica.l force.lt(Natur. t. 483). This may .... 11 prove 
applicable to &. number of in.ta.nce.. Bu.t choice propttr involves compari-
son which is only obtained by the pos •••• ion of .omething in common by the 
two obj.c'ta compa.r.d. 1I101f 'this something in comam is not e.notb.r phyai-
cal characteristic. Rather. what i. involved is ..... another klnd <t th. 
, 
same proce •• ft tou:nd in development. in which that which exi.ted !! p!!se 
actualizes itaetf in maturer form"(Nature I. 484). SpG'citlcally, in choice 
e. recognition occurs that one of tho two object. being compared yill more 
IOnThis I believe. is right, o.rul would be generally recognised as 
right, if it ftre not for the inveteraw habit of tHking at proc •••• a 01 
lite and mind through u:nrealb:ed mechanical analogy. Tbis babit is per-
haps the prHuct of indolenoe, it 1a euy t,o .i.ma.gine things happening aftor 
thO' manner of moving partic16IJ, it ls difficult to follow a process that 
.uppl1ea no mat..rial tor .uch imagea. But ft must. do what. we can to ri4 
ol1ra.lvea of anal~"y and preconception, and to 8 .. t.he facta u they are, 
an4 wilen we take growth of development where ft know it best, and try to 
describe accur~tely what happens wben, tor e:x:t\mpl., .... pas. from a YOra. 
t.o Ito better U1l4'1eratan4ing 01 something, or from feeble '\0 full responsive-
nea. to a muaical pea.age, it. aeems merely meanlngles. to say that 1I'l1at 
i. going On ia a NU"J"angement. of a~ or the enlargement of an aggregaw 
of theae, even if t,be atomatl by aome miracle, have Dcnt' beeome senaations 
or some ot.her aori of mental antit,.. What it dCH'*s appear to b. t. a pro-
cess in whicb the germinal becomes the mature, the potentia.l t.h. actual, ' 
in Yhieh I become what I ha4 It in .. to lMcOtUe, in which, &IJ I review it, 
I CM see that nat I am at present yu thore in embryo, working itself 
out to completion, and laying the mYeI'Ient at ewry step under constraint 
through the character of what was to emerge." Nature It 481. 
i'l 
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effica.cioualy lead to lVl end than the other object, y111cb oerta.inly 18 not 
the superior foree of a stronger impulse. There 18 no Physical 8ttmull 
which one may call an end. 
Lastly, Blan.hard returns briefly to inference as a third supporting 
testimony tha.t. thought IIcales the _chanistio bounda.ries. "The point may 
be put in oither of two ways. either meehwl1sm knoys nothing of necessity 
while inference- c~ot do without it; or a8 the self-development of an ~ 
inf~.u·enee is o.;not,her spoeie$ of the process .... have just been considering. 
Mechaniam la content to take its la .... as descriptiona of fa.ct r"tlael" thu 
... statementa of Deces.ity. The law that A causes!J for esample, is not 
. 
.. IItatement that A.'. nature neco.sita;tes B'., it does not pretend to sa" _ _ 'J 
mon thau that! regularly is followed by !.ft(Na.~Ul"e I. 484) But Blan-
811ard holds, o.nd defers justU'ication until later, that any valid account 
of inference involves the bond of neco.llity. If! folIo .... A. it ill b&-
cause B and A are linked necosII&I"il,.. It. i. felt ... incomplete and not. 
- - -
wholly intelligible unle •• it. relation to B ia perceived.... Interence 
-
is .. Foe e •• in which t.he nature of A, toget.her wit.h an fJl:ma.nent id."l of 
intelligible .ystem, controls "bat shall emerge u 1. ! ia recognized as 
.. fre.gment., torn from a. larger whole, and tile mind in seeking this whole 
is compelled t.o develop A along aome lin.s rat.her than othera"(Nature I. 
. -
485). If this is trne, then of course there ia a. necessary link betwen 
! and!_ Uia pOint, pre$ently, Is that inferenoe Is essentially controlle 
by a.n iJ:llD&lent. end of the mind which does not. allow deTelepnent, choice 
and inference t.o be separated. A.a te.ken t.ogetbar, theae three elements 
lead to the inadequac,. of the meChanistic expl&nation. Nothing shert of 
,j 
, 
i 
" 
I 
I 
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theMe conceptiona, t\.J1d their distinctiveness from the walt; analogies otftnd 
by the mechanists, will satisfy an adequate explanation of the nature ot 
mind. The conclusion is that the general theory of ide&s i. harmonious 
with t..he general nattU'e of mind. FQI" if an idea is .. partit\Uy realised 
purpose, it i. perfectly in conformity with the teleological character of 
mind. 
It i8 t.ime to 8l1l111.1a1*ise. Driefly, '1'9 have, ill the tiret chapter, dis 
cUIIBed the genera.l nat.ure of perception, pointing out tha.t perception is 
the beginning of .. long pilgriJilase that b:u trU't.h for ita goal. toll .. \. 
tbougbt. i8 implicit in perception, We noted that perceptual meaning is 
, 
structured by .. depth and range ~liob is .. prerequisite for .!Elieit 
lng, and that only on ... dition that there ia a depth and wi .. r~e of 
perceptual meaning, does the free idea come on the scene. W. next noted 
BlaDshard's theory that the relation between idea and objec. i. that. of 
the partla,lly realtaed .. the fully realized, of the poten.lal to the 
actual. In explaining thi. f we asked whether this teloologie .. 1 notion .f 
tbe idea i. compatible with tbe nature ot mind, we found that the processes 
of growth, eboi •• , and inference lend support to tbe teleologioal charac-
tor of tile idea. Wo nOW' turn to the question of 'Whether the .&me theory 
of the idea agrees with the tacta of knowing. 
D. Teleology and. the Nature of herring 
The theory of tbe idea is expected t.o Meard, tor if mi,nd is teleo-
logical, tbe functions of mind sbould manit •• , purposiVeneE$ also. Those 
functions, Which Dl&nshard groupe under knowing, are n ••• perceiving, 
judging, inferring, imagining, doubting, conjecturing, wondering ... "(!!-
ture I. 486). They are all del~"1l&tAd &1 KnOY'ing activities sinoe they 
-
all imply one end, since they &11 are seeking Jmcnrledge directly or indi-
rectly. '!'lIey are the processes (lmOYing) by which one reaches tbe end 
(JmOW'ledge). Knowing ia a process tha.t hu for its end Imcnrledge. We 
have listed the e.ctivities which constitute t.he proeesa, but have yet to 
d&termine ita end. 'What is knowledge,11 "If the proceas of thought is a. 
imOW'ing activity, and knO'W"ing activities tl.I'e defina.ble only through the 
end they are att6mpting to reali.e, there can be no elcape from the obli-
gation to .et out this end e.e explicitly as polslble"(Nature I. 481). The 
responae to this obligation is "bat Blan.hard is gradually leading to. 
For fthe moment however, he la conoerned aimply to ahoy that the idea, fUJ 
its object .!!!. 2!ss~, comport. with the na.ture of TmOyina. In achieving 
this, he pFopoaea to ah(t'W' that (1) knoYing sMb to apprehend the nature 
of things, that (2) JmOW'ing Involves the achievement of a very certain 
Ideal set by the mind-. own character, and that (3) bOWing disoloaea re-
ality insofar ... it achieves this immanent ideal. 
To the firat contention there ia almost universal agreement, except-
ing the pragmatiata, who rega.rd the purpose of krunrlng in a more instru-
mental cont.en. But if ". are t.e di.tinguish Imcnring from tancy, then t.he 
II"". might indeed dismi •• tbe queation 'What ia lmowledge?' a.s an 
unreal one. aince genuinely t.o uk a question suppoaes that one eM tell 
wen 1, t is arunrered, and if one lmow enough a.lready to 1mOW' 'When 'What is 
knowledge" is arun,ered, one alre&4,. tm0Y8 what lotowledge 11. This ia not 
verbal trickery, there is substance ta it." Nature, I, 481 
26 
distiuguiahing characteristic feature would be the gruping of tlte indepen-
dent Yorld--whether present, past, or future--attempting to subject our 
thought to whet is exterior to ita "It is impossible to find aD inster.aee 
of thinking or lmOYing that does not go beyond its cnm in&chinery so far 
a.a to intend and cla~ the disclosure of an ulterior order to which it i. 
in some sens. adjuting it"elf. If this is realism, then all of us are 
realist."(Natur~ I. 488). 
If the first contention is true, namely that knowing .eeks to go be-
yond it.eelt, it obvioualy h ... an end in yi.1I'-" ••• at once immanent and 
tratUlcendent"(Na.ture I. 489). The transcendent end is seeing the nature 
, 
of things, YI'lile the i.lmsanent end is the satisfaction of the impulse that 
initiated the knowing process originally. It is set by the mind's own 
nature and guides and governs the direction and activities of any desire. 
"Once the seeking haa reached What w111 satisty it., '" ou! see that it n8 
in se&rcb of this all along. just as in feeling for the right word, though 
.... cannot specify what .... want beforehand, .... can at once recognize it 'Ibm 
it comes.... We must wait and see what satisties us and compare wbat 
satisfies less with what 8at.i.f:l.ea more" (Nature I. 489-490). TItus it can 
euily be aeen that what n call Imowledge at. anyone at.a.ge may be no more 
than 'lrilat satisfi.s a given intelligence at the level of its peeuli&l" de-
velopnent. One implication, perhapa, ia absolute 8kepticism, since both 
the tra.ucendent l\Dd immanent goals might not be atta1nable. But to say 
that one knowa that JmOW'ledge is ncn-e:d8tent is not only absurd but con-
tradictory. If knowledge does occur, bot.h of these ends must be realized 
.!! ~ de~re.!-for t.here mut be an object to bave knOYledf~e!!, and some 
, 
I 
I, 
! 
If 
criteria to which it mast contcrm. If JOlowledge did not go beyond itaelf, 
i.e., he yond mind, there would be no obJect, and therefore no knowledge 
~. Secondly, if there were no nece •• ity for a criteria to which it should 
confoJ"m, then 'there YOUld be no standard for lmOYled~r,e. Thi. double oon-
.tra.int mut be f11lfilled if there i. to be any ImOYledge at all. Both 
an imlDl:m.ent end and transcendent end must somehow be compatible. Knoyledp 
moat be ..... at once a revelation of the object and 3 realization of 0 
.61.,..., an adjuatment to outer supply and inner demand ... "(Nat.ure I. 491). 
If this is 80, how, one could aek, is U. poIl.fble that wha.t fulfills 
the.e two sets of conditions (tmowledge) ah?,lld be the lene, tlla.t w&.t the 
mind is .att.fied rith, should a.lso be what is given h;r the external 
world,18 Severa.l &n.8'W'el'"S are po.sible. One arunrer, a common one, is that 
the two variable_the .tandard set b;r the mind, ud tbe external world to 
w'hieh Imcnrledge shou14 oonform-e.re independent. Thus knO'ffledge 'WOuld be 
either miracle or traud~il'"acle, becaU8~ it YOUld be quite coulcident&l 
t.hat t.here sbould be a barmoDY bet.ween the structure of the ".rld and the 
nat-ve at mind. Their contin .• l hflrJ'mOny is incredible. 01" it would be 
fraudulent--scepticlsm. For what would compel one to rely on chanee coin-
cidenee or just plain luck' -Experience would be & sustained paranoia, 
which, even if' it made occasional contacts with a world outside, would 
leave \l8 un$ertaln what YU dreMl and what fact" (Na.ture I. 491). 
What., then. it the two ends are not independent' It the,. are not in-
"pendent, this does Dot mean that the... ia a simpl. indenttfication ot 
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the irmtanent end, Et.8 realized, with the tre.nscendent end or object. For 
one can tl1iruc of an object 'Without having either itself or My of its eon-
tent present in imagory. ttOur whole inquiry into the nature of fmoW'ledge 
issues in this, that ide3 and object must be the aarne, yet cannot poasibly 
be sott(,tta.ture 1. 493). Wbat ia the escape from this dilenma? TIlanshardftJ 
answer ia consistent with his theory of the idea, namely, .. • •• that any 
attempt on the part of thought to realize its immanent end, however feeble 
it rnay be, ia also a partial realization of its tr~cendent end or object. 
Thought ••• ia a balt-way nowte on the road to reall ty. Ideas are poten-
tial objects, entities mloae nature and being lie in e. germinal embodiment 
, 
of that which they yould beeome"(Nature I. 494}. The paradox remo.ina a 
l)l'lol"a.doX. in some respects. But that doea not necessa.rily mean it is mys-
terious. 'The tvo &re tbe same yet difffu·ont. It ia the e.etual in the p0-
tential, the end in tile proce ••• IS The idea then is both the same a.s and 
different from ita object-8ame, ainee U. ia, !!! I!Osae, tho objeetl diffe 
ont, aince the object, u ita end, 1s only incompletely realb:ed. Ideas 
are sintila!" to their objects, but f.I, is tbe similarity of wat is in 
to tbe same t..hing actualized. Blansbard haa distinguished "hat the idea 
is from nat ia its term or aim, the Idea, from the end whicb it seeks to 
be but Is not. The object is in tbo'tllJht, but .. ••• not in that flosh-t\l1d-
blood actua.lity whieb would me.ke thinldng something monstrous, but. in var-
ious stages of realization"(Na.ture I. 491). 
Certa. inly the (thove para.gl·a.ph conta.ins a host of ilnplicit referO'll('.;fHJ 
to historioal problems concerning the na.ture of TmOYledge. Pe.r'Uoula.rIy 
it raises tIte question ot the rel8otion between idea and object. This is 
the central problem in any theory of' !moyledge. In the Aristotelian t ..... 
dition, there is still no a.bsolute e.greement on whether to emphasize the 
activity or passivity of the mind in bowing, or whether kno1t'ledze is a. 
9G'ntU'ied thing or a reified menta.tion. Which has bel.m actualized, mind 
or thing? 
, 
We might profitably pause to consider some of the aspects of this 
lem in the Aristotelian tra.dition. In t.bi. tradition, ttle.!!.!! of the e:m-
t.t.ence of Im01t'ledge seems to be evident. 14 Wha.t is in need of expla.nation 
ts t.he nature and conditions of kncnrledge-who.t t.he fact of knowledge 1m-
-
pli,e. in regard t.o knowr and !mown. 'rhe facts seem to indica.te, a.t leut 
v,~ely, that 'What 1. meant. by Imowledge ia tha.t. one being is CO'd8.io118 of 
&not.ber. A. fmO'W'ing being becomes something other than it.4elf. N01f' the 
problem i. in determining in what wa.y the one being (the fmowr) becomes 
sometbing "other". Doell t.he knower impose 0. category upon "bat ia given 
in .enso.t.ion? Ia the transition made wit.h or without alt.era.t.ion? Indee« 
the problem poses many alternative solutions. Happily, some a.lternatives 
ca.n be disposed of witbout dispute. It is evident to Arierf-otle thn.t. when 
l~tienne Gilson, !!!!. 9,llristia.n Philo.oeltz..!!~. Tlaomo.n Acquinas, 
(New York, 1956), 224. 
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the Imower oecomes Nlotber thir:g t it certainly cannot, as Dlan.sba-rd cor-
rectl,..said. 0ecome the object in tb.e 'flesb.-a.nd-blood actuality.' nather, 
the knowr must. be "potentiall,. ident.icl\l in charact.er "ith its object 
lI'ithQut being the object... And tt ••• mind. in order ••• to lmo.", must be 
}lure from 0.11 admixture; for the co-presence of '\1"-a.1:. is &lien to its na.ture 
13 I'J. hintlraneea.nd f}. blocI,_ ... 1t Mind If _ •• can have no na.·t'.lre of ita own, 
¢t.h~r thfm h;:\'Ying a eertai:o. Ctl.{ioi\Cit.y."US no", then, given those conditbs, 
can the kno'MU" 'become' the object? !lOY can it tbint£ a.n object? Aristotle 
recognizes this difficulty, a.nd in order to rca.el! a. solut.ion, .lto .... tllat 
the knower 3D.d the know e.re somonow compe.tihl0 J "For interaction hotween 
, 
two to.ctorll i. held to requ.ire a precedent community of na.ture between the 
ft\Ctora .,,16 Tlli. eO:mtmlnity of Dature meana that, like t!lind, things too 
must in some degree he innaterial. "The element in an objoct usimilable 
to a t.ll0Ugbt is it. f3rm.,,11 Theretore. to say that a. knowing being be-
comes Oii.:o. object. means tba.t the moyer becWf:les the form of the object/. 
To return to Aristotle, "Knowledge and sensation are diyided to correspond 
tialitles, o.ctu&l knoyled;';e and s·e1llJ3tion to actualities. Within the soul 
the t'aeulties of ImOYledge and sensation are pot~ntially these objocts, 
the one what is knowa.ble, the oMler "ha.t is scuible • They 1!.rdSi;. be elther 
Its.Vistotte, De A.nit~, III, 4, 429 .. , 16, in Tbe llo.s~c )!orltS 2.! ~­
"t:.ot,e, edited by Rhli&rcf McKeon,rNew York, 1(41) ,"""'ggS. 
16 ~., 429b S5, 591. 
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the t.hing. th .... lft. or their tOl'll8. The tOl"lMr a.lwrnattTe is of course 
-- ...... -. 
i,mp!saibl.. It is not .!!!!. stone 'Which .!! present.!!.!!!!..!2!!.!.!!.!!!. 
~.ftI8 This, incidentally, seems Tery cl08e to DlaDsbard's analysi •• 
BIMShard, however, dns not speak or the 'form' ot It. thing being preaent, 
but rather speaks of the idea as being present in It. stage of ita re~liza­
tton ot the obje.t. 
Now the next probl •• , to continue with the Ariatotelian analysis, la 
to uk whethe,. 'fihe ttom' 1. true to the oll.ie.t. Is the torm the obj •• t, 
or something 4itterent fro. it? FurtheraoN, Itcnr ia the fo:rm tranaported 
trom object to knonr? At this point, the po.ition be .... more cempti ... 
, 
oated with the introduction of the tel'll '.~.i .. t, tbe intermediary bot .... 
boyor an4 object. Tht. intermediary, without .euing to be tbe object, 
bec .. a the nbj .. t. The object is known by meau of the preaeace of ita 
apeel •• in thought. The .pecie., apparently, is the object _d ... the mode 
of speei... ftUtld.r this one condition only 0&11 ". say tbat It is not the 
.peci •• of the obj .. t that ia pr ... nt in thought, but the obje.t through 
its .peci... .And u it i. the form of the obj .. t Yhich is its acti .... and 
determining principle, 8. it is the term of the object which the intellect 
which bon it,. througb the species, becOllls ... 19 In this ny, th. objec-
tivity .f kn .... l.dge ia guarded, ""e .tnd does net bOY aD intermedi&fty , 
but the obj.ot through the intermediary. 
leAristotle, ~., 8, 43lh 29 (italics mine). 
IIGil.on, p. 221. 
Now the aboTe analysis pl"OliIlpted Aristotle to maintain that the in-
t.elligible in act ill the intellect. in act. t:t ... the soul is in a Yay all 
things ••• an4 knowledge is in a Yay Yha.t ia kno .... bl., and seneation ie in 
a Yay what ia 8eneible.M20 In other yorda, the object., as knowable, is the 
fom which is Imnn through the apeei ••• 
NOW', rith thi. AristotAU,an anal,..ls f.n mind, it .... apparent t.ha.t 
-Bla.nabard'. maiD probl •• (MOUr note inquiry int.o the nature of Imowl.dg. 
" 
'Ii 
!,' 
II 
I 
,I 
II .~ 
I 
, 
lasue. in thi., that idea aad .bj.at .. t b. the a_, ,..t. .annot po •• ibly!'1 
be •• tt~at.ur. I. 491), hu .. tair ..... l.gue in Aristot.l. of a lik. cneial 
nat.... It. •• eJDSt.hat., in priDeipl •• Blan.hard res.lve. t.he probln in 
, 
much the same _.,. as tha.t of Aristotle, although wit.hout the us. of Aris-
t,otle·. "!'Ilinology. At leut it. ..... c.rtain t.h~t Bt_hard hu made a 
gallant effort t.. pre.erve the objectiYity of knowledge, a.lthough he is 
in need, perhapll, of a tliat.inct.ion betwe.n t.he physical .bject, a.n4 the 
same object. in the intentional order, b.t ..... n that which is and that. ~nich 
is Imcnm. At 1e ... t it. youid provide a aharp 4i'9'18i08 botween the itYOt .... 
so t.baa the tli.tinetioD b.t. ... n the potential &ad the actual. 
At any rate, Blan.hard's th •• ry ot the idea, as a partially reali.ed 
purpo •• , or the object itself !!. ra •• , ..... to sati.f,. th(! con4i1iiona 
tha.t, the nat.ure of .lad. an4 t,he W\Rre of ImOYing d.ma.nd.. ObTioualy, te-
leolegy ,Jays 8iD import.oat role in his theory of thought, mel it will 
greatly contribute to the later doctrine ot the nature of truth. But be-
2°Aristotle, ~,481bll. 
tore moving on to new wrritory, n should perhaps scan OUl" foot8wpa me-
mentarily, in order to refleot on the effect of his theory. One familiar 
with epistemology i. aware of the labyrinths or difficulty that other 
theories have encountered. Most of the difficulties 'llrer8 assocb.ted with 
the relation betnen the idea u inltanent and the obj.ct as transcendent, 
and it see .. that m~st of the theories found a congenital impasse in asso-
ciating or inf,ersecting the •• tn moat fundamental data in 'What ft knOW' 
u kD01f'3 realltz_ Blaubard t • theory Is, ao to apeak, an international 
110ue along the epistemological higlnray. where auch di"."e bedf.llows as 
the copy theory. critical reali •• neo-r.all_, benavioria, and. even pr 
, 
mati .. (on eondi tional adllli ttance). may find rapport and camaraderie UPOD 
receipt of a nomin.al ree. The tee, of covs., ia .. compromise, t •••• Bl 
shard's theory is compa.tible with the other theories only on condition 
that they retrain from making absolute st(\tement8 about thought. Thought 
may be influenced by stimuli, bu~ ia not absolutely d.etermined by the •• 
Thought maY' have a.n end, but not 801 ... ,.. a pragmatiC end, and so with the 
others. Thia theory of the idea is not entirely new wi tit BIA'Uhard, al-
though ho seem. to have arrived at it rath •• independent,ly.Sl Uia posi-
tion is strikingly cloae to Royce's although the latter's development of 
it is quite different _ Royce mo.intains tha.t. the idea l' ••• is a. c\)gni-
8lnFor readers not at home among theories of thought, it should pe 
ha.ps bo e.dded that the theory here offered is not, ney. For a time' I igno-
rantly supposed it 11'8.8. When I first worked it out in my on mind, I YO.8 
not a1l'8.re of follOWing anyone. But &8 I went on to seek confirma.tion of 
it, I saw that something very like it wa.s the conDon prope1"tl of me~h:r­
ai.ians of the Platonic turn of mind from the fatber ••• to Drtldley. DO-tID 
quat, a.nd Royce." Nature, I, 518. ' ~~":JU\ 
-
~} , 
I, 
,'I 
tin process only iuaofar 80S it la, e.t the lIame time, a voluntary procells, 
an act, the partial fulfillment, •• far as the idea consciously extends, 
of a pttl"pHe. The object mt'lft.llt by the idea. is the object becMUJe it is 
"illed to be lIucb, and tbe will in question is the Yi11 that the idea em-
bodies ... U It is obvious, that for Royce, teleology plu.ya an importl'lJlt. 
role. "Now the obvioUII wa.y of stating the "l1ole .ena. of tbese tacts is 
to point out that what the i4ea alwa,. aima to tind in its object is noth-
-
.!!S. Ybate ..... !" !!! l!!! idea.' • .!!!~onacioWl l2!!l!!se '!!:'!!!!t embodied J:!. .!!!!! 
.!!!!!! determtn •• !2!:! tJla.u the idea by it.elf alone a.t tbi. inatant con-
sciously pos.e •••••• aa This similarity, however, ts not to> identify DIan-
, 
shard with Royce. Royce 'WIe. the theory ot' t.be idea u one step ill a. meta.-
ph18ical s,..temJ wheres.a Dla.nslta.rd applies it to the lUOTe&lent of reflec-
tion and the goa.l of thought,S. 
Thi. ends the t.reatment. of Bla.nahard's theory of the idea 38 developed 
out of percept.ion. It is not, however, the whole enterprise of thOtlgbt. 
Thought does not end nth the idea, but progresses into an explicit re&son-
:i 
'1'1 
ill 
1:" 
ing with the ideu. "It must lni.roduce a. .,..tem among them, and tben, if' :!I 
possible, a. rider system. And onee la.unched on this process of exptmsiGll, 
where are ft to halt' Are ft to ... ,. that every thought. is the sta.rt of .. 
pilgrimage 'Which, if pressed, 'Would take us ev~rmere else"'(Nature I.3M) 
2SJoIiJ1a.h Royce, .!!.!!. !orld ~ t.he Individual, (Ne" York, 1958) 32t'S. 
23 
.!2!!., 321. 
a~a.ture. I, 518. 
Certainly it lfG are to toJ,e Plato at his 'Word, it can be had. For tf ••• 
when a. mt'm brut recalled a. Bingle piece of kU01rledge-learned it, in ordi-
no.ry langue.ge-there ia no rea.son 'Why he should not find out 0.11 t.he rest, 
if be k&epe a at.out. heart and doell not grow weary of tbe aearch.tt25 NOW' 
this pilgrimage, according t.o Bla.tuaha.rd's analysia, see. to be less a 
'science of lel.alI,' t.han a seienc. of tbings. There is no recollect-ioB 
of ideu, but an expanded grup of the yorld 'WOn througb perception and 
the idea, 'tllought i. a. process toward the achievement of intellectual in-
tAgri"y, hoping t.o bring everything into the veb of necessity. We nOW' 
turn to the considerat.ion of t.he atepII by which thought is expanded, and 
, 
how this constitut.e. a. coherenee t.heory of iruth. 
-
CffAP'l'ER III 
ltEFU!CTION. THE APmOACH TO Tntr1'B 
".A. teleologioal proces. • •• must be appre-
hended througb it .. on4. It. now appears tbat. 
mind on t.he cognitive side i. a proces. of 
realising the kid of system in which noth-
ing is omitted anel notbing arbitrary.... What. 
t.he end. 1. in detail ". cannot .ee. But at 
every leftl of t.hought .... oan feet ita im-
puIs ••• and our knowl.dge of what. it i. a.nd 'What it. 
aaka of WI grow olearer with every stop of OUl" 
apprO&.Cb.ttl 
It ... stated earlier that there ia both WB immanent end and transcen 
dent end involved in the natu", of thought "cording to BlMUlltard. The 
ir:uanent. end 1s the theoretic impulse toO aehle" 'the external object a.8 
it. real1,. is yitbin experienoe. "But the immanent end of thought torhida 
WIJ to say that, we haft reached t.he objeet as it really is so long as that 
object remain. tmintelligibl"'(Nature I. 23). Of course the 'object' cau-
not, it seems, beoome absolutely or tot.ally intelligible. Already v. ~re 
pa.rt Yay on the road toward the achievement of t.he abject,. Md therefore 
there is some intelligibility pr.sent. It 1. necessary, however, to esplt 
cat. the f.\1O"VGment. t.oYa.rdIJ intelligibility. And this movement "i11 be one 
1nla.naha.rd, !!!!. ,:!ournal !! Philosoph:r, 38, (A.pril, 1941) t 214-815. 
in the direction of system. For according to the previous analyses, there 
is a. teleological foree at work, an end which govern8 the movement of 
thought. Our concern, then. is to ascertain wet that end is and to 'What 
degr •• it may be entertained by the human mind. 
J.. Uaderst,&ndlng 
Bla.nsbard bolcls that " ••• the mOTement of reflection is alwuys more 
or less dominated by an ideal of understanding and that what understanding 
means is a.pprehending .omething in a system 'Wllich renders it necessary" 
(Nature II. 24). The degree to wldch there ~u an immanent end guiding 
reflective processes determines the character and validity of thought. 
Thi. i. e~inently demonstrated by the logiCians (DIanshard apparently ap-
plies this to logicians in general) no maintain that although tlley are 
not describing the way actual thought occurs, they are defining what ideal 
reasoning yould or should. be. One of Blanshard· s main tenets is " •• _ 
that unle •• thought i. reoogni ••• as the pursuit of such an idea.l ••• nei-
ther logie ner the P4Y'lhology .f thinking ea.n do its york" (Nature II. 24). 
Blanshard tmpU.e. the nec.ssity of 80186 rationale or final cause, a.pparen 
1,._ Wha.t the eaue of this idee.l ia, is ind.eed open to clebate. It 'Would 
seem that Blaashardts teleology demands a god to prepare the situation, 
i.e., to adjust the knower to his end. Tha.t, however, is not implied by 
Bltmaha.rd. We may recall, nevertheless, his ea.rlier treatment of infereme, 
1Fhere he maintained tha.t even in perception there is direction towa.rd an 
end of int&l1igibtl:lty. Why sbould Dot logic be ca.lled upon to clavI,. 
enunciate it. goal' "If ye found a trea.tise on ethics that enumera.ted 
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rules of good conduct, but forgot t.he aumoWll boaUJa, we should feel that u 
a nrk on .tld.es it left something \. be desired"(Nt\tu:r~ II. 25). ClelU'ly, 
then, any di •• vsion of thought .. t dneMa the end it is seitking to .... 
ehieTe. 
'rhe ... tion arises, however, as to bOY this contention can be justi-
fied. Where cu we look for exampl.s' Certainly a.ll enquiry is an at-
tempt to an ... r questiona, and all quest.iona oontain, explioitly or impli-
citly, the question 'Wb,., This 'Why i. satisfied wit.h au expla.na.t.ion which 
is garnered when something is underatood. Something is understood, in 
turn, tt ••• only when some hypotbesis regarding the point. tha.t YU in 
, 
doubt is apprehended as pa.rt. of' a. system whIch is taken to render it necea-
sar1"(Nature II.H). The following examples give Blanshard's meaning in 
'lhe task of underattmding geography or utronomy eon-
aisw, in .0 .ma.ll pvt., in relating spatia.lly a pr .... 
digious number of bodies of land and bodies of water, 
of plu.et.s and a .. , and the tall pattern of tId • 
• pat!.! uni~.rae runs far beyond the present. grasp of 
iiberllimt. So doea that of oftn" in time. Any und .... 
sttmdiJ.lg of. history atSt. begin by the pla.eing of ma.ny 
oceu:rre ... in the OI"del" of before and a.ftel", but &11 
t.ho.t we can .0 a.t. present. is to drive & tew _take., so 
to apeak, in a. .veam without 'begimli.ng 01" 011,4. Anoth-
er such bomegeneous .,..t.em is t.bat. of number, within 
which lie all the problema 01 arithmetic, &Bot.her 1s that, 
01 pure quantit.y, dealt with by algebra; still anot.her 
is tha.t of degre.. Tbe.e ayat.ema 01' order. a.re all homo-
geneous. ~t. inexhaustible. Na.t.ure, II, !s-a9 
If n then uk why tile mind is sati.fied ntll an arultwer to a question put. 
in any of theae or ot.her areu, it is only because the amnrer explains and 
enable. one to unde.rstan.d ono t.hing as & part of a systemt 
If there is a doubt. wbether t.hia result. i. t~Jieal, it 
yould be veIl for t.he reader to take cases at random 
and subject tbem to nnelysis. Why does ordinary light, 
in po.astng through a crystal t bl-t:HW£. up into & spectrum' 
Why did the French R.evolution occur? . Why do makers of 
rn&cbines pu~ safety valves on boilers, or fl~eels on 
engine crankshafta? Why i. treason commonly punished 
with so bea.vy a penaltY1 Why should Ye a.ccept, the equa.-
lity of the angles in a triangle to exactly t"o right 
angles' Why should winding 8. clock a.t the back make the 
bo.nda in fr_t. go round and move at an even speecl? If 
the reader hu any doubt that W"l:u.\t tltink.ing el'ldea.vours 
to reach ia a SJ'lltem, more or lea. large, in which to 
connect events or tact. previously unrelated, let him 
make what he would regard as a SAtisfactory anawer to 
any of the.. questions. or to any other of Ids own 
choice. &nil look at it analyt.:l.ea.l1y.· This yill give 
hie a cheek on ~~ .results. (Nature, II, 31~) 
Nov U. seems evident tbat the necessAry satiafootion of system ie 011e 
phue ot fI. criterion 0' knoW'll t.ruth. B1a.us~Q.J"d's difficulty, hO'lr'eftl', con 
sist. in sbmring that it is the criterion. .A. compromise with Bl&.11sl1o.l'd 
-
you1d perhaps consist in agreeing that 'lI!Iyatem' or coherence ansnrers the 
'1hz and correspondence the ..!2!!. Together, both give the truth of em 
. . 
eTent. ?his, perhaPfl, ia the ntea.ning ot Aristotle' 8 ca.usal tbeory "hich 
is developed in the Ph:!!ic.. Aristotle statea that tt ••• we do not think 
that "e mOlt' a thing until ft are acquainted ri1,h its primary conditions 
or firll!lt prinCiples, e.nd In •• ft carried our ana.lysill!l as far as its simplest 
elements ... 8 In order to grup the 'why' of 8. thing, one mu.t bow all of 
it. causes-the 'yhat t t or the thing i tae lr( es.en •• ) t the wbl or the pur-
pose or goal .f a thing, and the thow'--what Arill!ltotle called the efflc~t 
caus.. Bla.ashard, in emphasizing the coberence theory (lrhich will be di8-
cu.ed II!Ihortly) YOuld 8eem to Yalue the t final caus. t (purpoa. or reason) 
.. 
2Ariatotle, Ph,!! •• , 1,1, 184&, in McKeon, Da.sic Works. 218. 
more tba.n any other. Tlu~re i8 80aG merit in this solection, for as Aria-
totle 8aid, the final cause is prior to ~11J3 it is the cause of cauaes. 
We shall see, hoyover, tbat according to nl&nslmrd, the coherence theory 
i.8 held to be the 11ltinm.te tellJt, that int.o which all others a.re subsumed. 
The difficult (perh&ps impossible) ta.sk, for Blanabard, is to arun'ler 
what kind of a 8YI.-t.e. thought. ends in. One anJlYer would be a clasaifica-
tion of tJl1ngs int.o genua and specie.. Another yould be the compression 
01 everything into mathematical or geometrical formul&e--Or even mechani-
cal model.. But it is more in accordance wit.h t.he mind of Dlanahard that 
, 
be achieved by" • _. relating thlnga in anyone of a ride w.riety of cate-
gorie ........ ualit.y, _an. and end, genua and .peeie •• and other."(!!'att.'ll'!. 
II. 33). W. may aug«.st here that Aristotle'. causal t.heo,.,. _y contain 
substantially the .6me __ ing as Dlanshard t • coherea •• theory_ But prior 
to aay tl"eat.r4e:nt of the system its. If , .... prOPOH to treat the steps in 
the movement. of reflection it •• lt. 
'l'he rise 01 reflection begins, as Blansbard says, bocause ot a. ten-
IIJI0::1 in the theoretic impulse, a. tension tt ••• bet.ween one's pre.ent con-
rusion and ignorance e.nd some tu1... of understandi.ng not yet. attained, 
between the crudity and cha.os to be found within the present ideat and the 
--_ ... ----
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imma.nent end of the knowing impulse which is e.t vorl' in that idee and urg-
ing its expa.nsiontt(~8:tur~ II. 41). We might aga.in reTort to Aristotle for 
comparison on this point. In the Pheiea he atates that tt ••• what ia to 
U8 plain and obvious at first ia rather contused masa.a, tl~ .lementa and 
4 prineipl.s of 'Which become raunm to U8 later by ana.l,..ia." W. might pro-
fitably seo in Ariatotl.'a statement Rlanaha.rd's contentlon that an impli-
cit ideal is presont, gradually developing itaelf to the limit, or working 
to1f'M"d a.n end which controls thought. We say this beca.us. at t.he conclu-
sion of the process of ualyai., what one ebtaina (known elements and pr 
cipl •• )muat have beon present even in the initially 'confused' state. But 
-
. . , 
just what the end ia .!!.!.!!!. cannot. perhaps, be explained. For " ••• 
when thought reach.. an immediate end in the solution of 0. particular pro 
lam, it does not stop there, if it ta allowed t. follow its own impulSion, 
it goes on spreading out1l'8.1"4 lib a riaing .e .. , stretching out arms of in-
terence, engulfing what i. inaular, transforming a single centre and into 
0. single whole aU, that is det.ached and fl"a.gmentt\1"1"(~ature II. 43). 
There ls, pel"bapa, no Yay to account for this move_nt toward an end 
which ia not explicitly bon. It is paradOxical, emd that 1. about all 
that can be said. tt It ia notoriou tha.t artista ma.y reach a high degree 
of performtmce who, when tIle)" begin to dlscus. Mathetics, are all at .ean 
(Nature II. 48). lttyaterioua it m&.y be, but it aeema to be quite tactually 
cont.ributory to the theory that the initia.tion of reflection is caused by 
an inner impulsion which seeks Ito more complete integrity. The mind i8 co 
, 
4thid., 1,1, 218. 
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fronted vith a.u a.lien, una8.imi~ted mat,ter "hich invites the thooretic 
impulse to uti "Tbere comes, as i..J'l...Ma.ebetb, a. kt"1ocIdng a.t the door by 
something tb~t the mind is not prepa.red to rooeiYe, but must find & pla.oe 
for tho unity of thougllt is shattered, outside tho continent tbat foftlS 
its mainland-to use a very useful figure-there appears an island tho.t 
ought to be attached to it and ,..t is not, §.ltd this disunion on the svfa.ce 
sots in motion a force belOWt lrtlich h,. its upneava.la and rearran~ement8 
seeks to unite the fr~nt to the mainlanr(Nature II. 48). This is the 
. ., 
impulse to intograte and assimilate tho foreign. 
The initial factor in tho rise of reflection. then, ia tho contron-
, 
tation .... ith e. disllarmony or confliot in mind. Bu.t granting that the mov-
ing impulae or conflict may be the .ame, 1Fhat caUlle. some minds to respond 
to the oal1 ot the impalae and other minds to ie~ore or even tail to ob-
serve the ~pulse' ~le existence of variation in response is quite evi-
dent. Some mind. are intell~otual1y 'etisfted yith little or no thought 
for views tbet ditter trom their own. Some minds, fortunately, refU$e to 
purchue conaistenoy by advertiD.g their eyes. The impH,ca.tion, tberefore, 
is that indhi.dual. difter yldel,. in intellectual cha.racter. Thero may 
be many reMODfl to account for such diversity, but they may be .nmronrized 
by saying it ia usually for one of three I"'eaaons 1Fhich ca.use some minds 
to ta.il in reflective response. n( a) they may ha.ve no m&inland to .ta.rt 
withJ (b) cllallenging iala.nds may not be fortbcoming, (c) both ma.y be pre-
sent and integration still fail through interference from Yitbout"(Nature 
• 
II. 51). }lot just 8.1l70ne, certa.inly. 'Would be able to assimilate the bio-
logical islands that .. Dftrwin could--chlefly bcc&use of the grent diversL-
48 
ty of the mainlands brought to confront those islands, or the insufficien-
cy of most people's mainland; 
For the plain man tIlis provides an intellectua.l native 
la.nd, t.be home of truth a.nd rea.lity; and My tIleory 
tha.t cannot prove citizenahip in it, or at leut show 
na.turalization papers on demand, be is inclinod to set 
down u a .uspiciotts alien. On this rock of routine 
perbeptions end" belief. he Ii,". as on an island in an 
unltSploMd se3 , seldom undertaking the lallOW" of re-
fle~togexcept wben something threatens--a ghost, a 
10.. ot inooDle, 8. 1088 of some prospective pleasure. 
,nlen refl •• tion does occur, it consista in extending " 
the bounda of this ... orld in stlcb rise as, if l>o.sible, 
to domesticate the thing tha.t threateu, or t.o circum-
vent it. Now this 'WOrld is in degree a. system. In1:.011:l.-
gib:Uity is not evenly diffused through it, but it is by 
no means 8. cbaos, it is shot through ... ith the lines of 
order; it is organized on prlnolples, it recognizes one 
spa.ce, one tice, one system of number a.nd degree, one in-
clusive nb of eaus,..:l,ion. (Natvo II. 58) 
The problem, then, is to fit the challenger for tbe challenged, to fit the 
mainland for the island, i.e. J that ... ould be the ideal solutiGn, .2!!. i,mpos 
sibile, if we were t6 have all reflective responses become identical. But 
that is not pos.ible. Tbe point is, however, that any refleet.ion occurs 
wi thin some trameyorK or .,..tem, that tbe goal of an,.. reflecting process 
is the insertion of scat.tered. disconnected elements into an int.elilgent 
whole. But although knowledge may be a necessary prerequisite for reflec-
tton in any field, that is not to say that it is sufficient. Something 
further is needed to actively pursue and 'riD ne ... knOYledge.Tbis is t.o 
say that Jm01fled.g9 .!! ..;;;i_ta;,;e;.;;;l .... f is not sufficient tG construct new inroads 
into a fuller system. Reflection Bay still be blocked eTen 1rilen a suffi-
cient mainland and compatible isl~da are present. The bridge from the 
mainland to the island is not spanaed automRticall,.. Some ability, then, 
to specii1' the problem i8 needed. This tas Ie will prove, undoubtedly, 
that thinking is the hardest 'Work in the world. 
The -specifica.tion of the problem' in this context means constructing 
a. linlt between (to continue in the S".1.1$ simile) the mainland and 001 island. 
F'or cummple, the problem of free "ill ia no't, a. problem for many people sint-
ply becl\use they have never put some problem relo.ted to free will into the 
forUI of a. quostiont "TIut let o.nyone try thintdng o.bout it 1I'ithou;t. impli-
citly or explicitly recasting it u a. question, and his t!lOught "ill be 
1rilfit menta thCtugbt on this subject nu 80 of ton been before, a. mere "31-
loYing in the sea, with sails helple.sly flapp11\g in tho wind. Once the 
thought in brought under 1,110 control of a. definite question, however, -
, 
Does a. decision or choice over occur without a. cR.use?-it r~~\d8 itself' a.ble 
to movc; it is a.s if a new h&",d he.d a.ppeared at ito helD e.nd a troof' wind 
ha.d got into its .ttils" (Nataro II. 61). Some form of question or construe 
t.ion of a problemat.ic belps to specify t.he problem which in turn helps ro-
flection to get wlderwo.y. For "In wf\nting t.o renow so::nethitlg, we must 
Tmo ... , however indefinitely, w-h:\t it is that we want to k.''1ow't(}~o:tur:e U. T:t. 
any bo.phc.zard phenomene.--o,t lce.at in the upper levels of science and philo-
sopby. S01l'lO el..1>licit specifica.tion process mast tn.rtG place if o:ny o.dva.nee 
I: 
is to be attain.d. "The tloint of' importance is that. it is logic, an il:Il- Iii 
_ I: 'Iii 
plicit but inper&tive logic, t.haot r;eta results in all tbese cases-not lucI, 
nor a~~w isolated f~ulty of intuition, nor some mysterious inscrutable 
Genius, "tf'Qyward but divine"(!o.tur.t! II. 11). 
So far, then, ft have aeen tbe Ilrobloma.tie char{>"ct,er of reflection, 
and that the solution to a. problem usually involves specificn.tion in the 
~i 
form of a. question-tbe question being the ..... atter:lpt by eo GJ"tem of 
idea.s to t\lend a hole in its own !a.brie ••• to brin~ -the frayed ed[~~s of 
t.he rent to light so that I:.is clear hoif' tmlch a~e must be :fillec~ cwd what 
t~roMB 1:0081:. be tUlitad'J(No.ture II. 18) .:Ve next turn to other steps In-
, 
volved in tbe reflective process. 
c. Observa.tion and Invention 
Evon aftor the problatn of reflection is 8!lecified and no conditions 
Bra hindering, some minds, ~ facto, are nevertheless incapaille of re£lec-
3 Hon. Tllis 18 due, nla.nshru-d holds, to ei~her or hoth of two thing/I: 
laelt of inventivenoss, 01'" la,cTt of' !olowiedco. 1'1.U) second we con tren.t ra-
thor briefly; the first in flore deta.il, prior to entering formally into 
the haunting questlo!:., "hat is truth?, which is the goa.l to which Blanslnrd 
is gradually loading. 
If specification through tlte formulation of a question does :not suf-
fice to put. the theoretic 1mpulao into e.ctioD, then ",ha.t is lo,eJdug t13:1 
be moro !'-..noYledgo-observs.tion to shore up tbe mainland in order to pro-
vide 0. brotMler base from whicb to approach islands at sea. For tt In spec 
tying a problem, on. mobili •• s one's resources in order or attack. nut 
wtum they are all drawn up they nay present so pitiable an array that an 
attack is obviously hopeless"(l~attU". II. T9). "'bat is n8odod, often, is 
5'There a.re fev people who can truly thinlt. Ta1:e a.n ordina.ry, in-
telligent plougbman Ybo reads his Dible and his Pooel.". Journal, and set 
llim dmm to think on a given subjeot out of his Usual run of Idoas, so.y on 
Conscription, one of tw thiru,J8 happens. TTis mind ••• 1ta.nders from the 
subjoct. ... 01" he fa-lIs asleep.' J. Ada.rns, Herbo.riian P8l!?hologz, 100-101. 
ill 
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observnt:ion t.o a.tto.in rJore (tate. in order to oQserve bettor a.nd eventually 
sitton which is c01iBist,i)nt with his theory of t.houghts ~WE h~ve iraI)lied 
that observation is domine.ted by t.hought, and since thought 
ten seeldng cOMpletion, it follan that observa.tion itself is controlled 
by the fro.gmentt!.ry .;ratems of ideu that 1\"e oring to t.he business of obse 
vingtt (Nature 11. 94). But the important point is ra.tber paradcxica.l a "lbe 
observation that is 'to count. in ref1eotlon must be directed, for good or 
11 1, by theory; Md yet the otaer'v&tion is p<n·formed ifl order th(t,t the tho 
ory fJay be arrived at.. 'this seems to imply that the end must be re~hed 
, 
betore we can select the means to it, 8lld is not that absurd? The general 
al'lSWOr here is the sa.me as the Msyer to the pa.radox of the search :lor 
imowledge, O"ltr grasp is general before it becomes specifio, Ll\d this gene-
ral lcnowledg'e is euoUlJh t.o keep OUl" search ••• wit.hin tbe field of the 
rel.T&Dtff(~&tur. II. 95). It is the immanent end striving to correlate 
itself with the transcendent end--the external object. 
nut besides specifica.ti1n and observa.tion, a. third importa.nt s'fiep is 
tbe suggestive leap offered by Wat Bla.nshard calls invention. the proh-
lem tbat. invention introduces is ..... hOY an end, e.lree.dy l>8.rtio.lly 
realized in the mind, gets the materia.l to extend or eOID!llet.e it'Jelf. It 
is the problem hoY a purr~8., instead of being eBcroechod on and aubmarged 
by the Yt\V08 of in-elev?"nt lmlmlse and a.ssooio.tion, pIa.ya Co.nute to them 
auccessfully and' reela.ima a. further dam.."tin troc the see.. Invention 1m ptU"-
pOIlilf1'! c,ss"twrng authority over the CCH:t.rse of ide~"(!iQ.ture II. 129). rne.n-
sbard mn.intaina thAt. thi& pnrposo is not c&uaed. by a. rM,doc [lOyer of the 
mind oalled t.he la". of uaociatlon-a.t lee.8t not exclusively. Rather, 
the purpose contains thought itaelf, a certain selectivity. "Nor la its 
york confined to selecting from matter passively received. It take. an 
acti Ye part in suunon1ng up this matter. Our contention ••• is ••• that 
in the mind of the anece.sful thinker the spirit of logic itaelf is at york 
leaYeDiug the unformed mass, and that in the mind of the creative artist 
the .pirit of beauty ia at York, supplying both ends and means"(Nature II. 
129). We turn DOY to liat some of the devicea by which invention extends 
and more fully .,.temati.e. thought. 
, 
D. Invention and Analogi 
Jamea maintained that there 11'0" two principe.l factors in reasoning, 
na.mely, s&gacity and inference.a Dlanahard agre •• that these elementa are 
quite necesaary, but neverthele •• inadequate. Something more ia nece •• er,y, 
••• the .sontrol Ja! analog b:r the ~onditions .~!.!!!!. 1!:oblem"(Nature II • 
13S). This control of analogy ..... i. perfectly useless, because 'W'IUl-
ton and random, except as the a.gent of an implicit system seeking comple-
tion by mea.na of it"(J'a.ture II. 134). It ia the principal torce and re-
source for 'Uloaght. If a peraon 1s 'W.ULble to solve a problem ill the con-
text. of a given situa.tion, he often resorts to another sitml.tion 'Which is 
analogous. We might reca.ll Pla.to's frequent employment of a. myth in m3ny 
of his dialogues where be is at pains to proTe a. point in a more litex-o,l 
fBShion. Bam lUm,,!se st.resaed the great im.portance of the conmJa.nd of 
~; I 
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ana-logy' 'In ever., subj.ct impl.,ing thought, u distinct. from mere memory, 
the poyer of identifying like things, through di.tance and disguise, is the 
main element of intellectual force •• T Thi8 Is not to say, however, that 
the expansion of thoughtcoD8isw in the col1Dl'lit1d of metaphor and analogy-. 
The nature of thought, ultimatel." i. the power to develop a 8ystem. ana-
logy being an assist.ant in the development. "It. i8 •• 41 t.o shOY hOlf a 
system 'Whioh in a ginn context i. incomplete may be completed. It tloe. 
s. by ahOYing that this system, when it appears in another context, fa com-
pleted in a pe.'l"tieular way, and by suggesting that In t.he pr.sent cue it 
may be completed in the same ft,"(.a~e II. 149-150). But it is important 
, 
that the analogy he e •• eDtial~l the same. But if it la esaentially the 
aame, hOY Ya8 th. ael"tion made' The same pa.radox keepa appearing in 
II_hard'. theory' "Is it not clo&l" that if the mind ia in a position to 
ae1"t, out of hundre4a of pos.ible analogies, the one that i. bu.d upon 
eaaentiala, it must know whst is o8aential al ... ady?"(N&ture II. 152) ~ 
If it already did know, then the resort to anal~ Ya8 needle.s, the ~ 
is, as 118nal, that the mind .. 11"' • ....,. Ime", partially, "hat it W'I.\S seeking. 
Ii. ftll .. part, of .. .,..t.em a.eking eompletion. " • .... bofore Ye r •• ort to 
analogy we b01t' roughl., er in general wba.i i. e •• eni.ial to out' r •• "lt ... tt 
(Hai.... II. USI). 11lftDtton, i.lleDt as on. of the steps in widen:ing i.he 
orhii. of reflection, i. t,he app4ta.ran.. of .omei.hing in fJae mind which is 
u.nd ... the Mgia of syawm. Every particular instance of refl"tion i8 
f Alexand ... Bain, .!!!.!!!!. studZ.!! CJ!arute .. , (London, 1861), p. 341, 
cited. in ~ature, II, 149. 
ft ••• itselt a. sub-sy.tem in o.n enormously "tder syst,$m.... Wha.t primari-
11' acta to produ.e suggestion I. a sub-system that is relatively small, bu 
this act. with tile ce-operation of bmwaerQ.ble moulding pressures front this 
let.rger baekoaro1lDd"(Na.ture II. 16S). This system, Dlanshard holds, is m8.:~­
da.tory, becauae it is th. completion of th'Ought, the emb.diment of an ideal 
of intelligibility which is th. implicit goal of thought. Man thinIa as 
he does in order to realis. tha.t idea.lt "fhe eye tha.t cu trace the lines 
of n ••••• ity aml single out the rel."f'lmt from the crowd of irrelevant us 
eiate. is tmder the guidtmce Yhich to the deseript.ift psychologist Is mel 
must remain invisible. It ia the guid3ftoe of the immanent end of thought, 
, 
'Of the ideal of the rational order, whose pressure, f.lt a.t ita strongest 
in such minda, organiz.s the chaos of experience. into relatt .. ly orde~ 
ly ranks. And if in the min" of the great disc.verers the.e ranks form 
th~elve. more readily and in closer alignment, what reas.n in the end 
can be giYen but that this iraman.ent, logic has so far gained cont.rol?"(Na.-
-
ture II). 
-
We ha.,.. thus briefly considered three atepa in the reflective process 
--(I) the definitioD or speoification of the problem, (a) the expansion 
of the mainland through obeel"'f'8.tio!1, and (3) the .leap· of suggestion, or 
inTentiyenosl,. 'What would come next in the explication of the na.ture of 
thought' Blushard couider. t.he pos.ibility of t1l'O additional steps-
elaboratioD and. verifica.tion. Wha.t thought nov poss.a •• a a.ft,$r the third 
atep is not the goal of th.ught or a oompleted aystem. What a. given mind 
has ao fv game,..« .eeds to be elabol"at,ed into it. implioationa, and 
after this hu been aoltie.,..., the implications might. be compared with th. 
'III,' : 'I~ 
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eXistential lacta. "Nerion, for example, 01100 tbe suggestion had come to 
him tbat pltmeta fall towa.rd the .un in obedience -t.o the so,,1le l&y as bodies 
fall lng to earth, hu to t."ice t ... o :fUrther stepa. ne must first dedube 
wn.t the motions of the planets 'wovld bG if his tbeory nre the true one: 
.' -
and secondl,.., he !fRlst com.pa.re the motions that on his t.heorY' ougbt t.o fol-
low with the motions observeble in faet"(N~turo II. 212). 
Bla.nshard. bO'W'Bver, doos not think that these two step$ constitute 
em iron-elad rule. Rather, he regards the two stepe of elaboration and 
verification u being essentially tbe some. Let us eD)la.in,. twd tltis rill 
&ntlcipete the follO"l!ring probleti of truth. It might seem tbat the ola.bo-
, 
ration of' the implica.tions ot 86Gb thot~ht is a distinct process from the 
1'roe085 of verif'ying our tl1ought-s, or the elaborated lmplic:.tttoIlS of our 
thought. with tlte exiBtential ·tlJt.Ct. t • Tbis would, if true, imply the co:a-
respondence test.. But according to Dianahard, tids distinction o.r1s.s be-
ctiruae it ill sUPlJOsed that in attempting to verity our thoughts we leave 
our thoughts and systems behind a.nd make contact with bare facts. Now 
this usu.mption be denies, and the denia.l is baaed on the conviction th~t 
the existential fact.. va only arrived tt.t througb our ideas and their 818-
tems. Hence the,. are inseparable It At the I!I&M time, Bla.."1sha.rd reMi1,. 
admits that Teri!"icati()n .r1U,tB upon 'Wilat is independentl,. given, so tba.t 
there seems to be no doubt that a real order of things stand over QgaiD8t 
men. Indeed, his whole trea.tment of perception and inferenoe is indispen-
sable rlthout it. It rill seem, ho ..... ftr, that he trea.ts verification as 
if it only involved Iystematic rela.tions of ideaa-a rather JlUmean flaTor 
which is deoeiving. But it one understands that the fa.ts are independent, 
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a.lthou,gh not arrived at !:! inde;endent. then Bltl',.nlShard.'~ metming will per-
ha.pa be indienUd.. This -tbeory Ie-ads t.o ·tl~o impossibility of &.ecepf~ing 
presently. AcL'1littedly, the prohleU" is very h~volved, 3.ud with tbis fmti-
ci~tor:r gliaDer, we shall !lOY turn to thie problem wbicli he.s been impli-
cit in the entire argument. 
CIlU"l.'En IV 
TRUTH, rrrE VERIFICATION OF TIIOUGHT 
DlMUlb.ard propose. t,bet. coherence is the valid and sole test of trutb. 
This is admittedly difficul~ to proTe, for eTen granting the valid rejec-
t.ion of all other t.heorie., one can neTer be sure that all the possibilities 
have b.en emausted. MoreoTer, there ma,. be ~several different test of truth. 
For alt.hough truth ma,. be the same everywhere it is found, tbe tests ot 
truth may Tt'.U"Y from instance t.o inst.a.nce. In geometry, self-evidence may 
be the crikri .. , whUe in morals a good conscienoe ~:r be tbe teat. What 
Blanshard hopes to do then, is to shoY that coherence is the ultimate, the 
ultima.te court ot appeal. If thia can be done, then tho.e who claim a dif-
fe .. ent teat ma,. have failed to puraue the ultim&te teat ruthlessly. " ••• 
the person who rejecta coherence can be shoft, in such fashion as to con-
vince l1im if he is unbiased, that be ia doing ODe or other of two things. 
either resorting to coherence without Imoring it, or elae applying a. stan-
dard that he bimself would reject as soon as ita nature was made explicit" 
(Nature II •• 5-21&). NOV' in order to set out the coherence theory of truth, 
it is perhaps useful to do this by citing the various contrasts to this 
theory. According to Dlanahard, there are sis distinct teats of trutb tha.t 
a.re generally accepted. They are (1) the pragmatic notion of working, 
&3 
(2) aut.hority, (3) mystical intuition, (4) correspondence with fact, (5)the 
!self-evidence t.heory, and (6) coherence.l The pra.gma.tic test bu been re-
jected by Dlanshard earlier.a The testa of a.uthority and mysticiam are able 
to be briefly treated, vltile oorrespondenoe and self-evidence will be tree:led 
in more detaU. 
A. •• Authority 
~\S to authority, this method of Yh~t Pierce called 'Fixating Belief.3 
is inberently contrary to e. philosophica.l a.nalysis of truth, preoisely be-
cause .!!l itsel.~ it ia lusui'fictently ro.tione.l~J it OM be pushed enough to 
show that authority ta not the S!oUBd, but merely e. type of verification 
used by a certain group of people to v.rify a matter they rega.rd (implicit-
ly) as beyond. their ken of inquiry or oomprehenaion. "Authori ty ma.y be the 
ilm'lGdia1ie ground, but. it the authOl'ity itself is aocepted for other and 
further reMona, it is th ... that tot"Dt the real ground.. ..Either their 
acceptance as authoritative ia ba.aed on reasons, in whioh case onee more 
authority ia not their ultimate ground, or .18. it ta made with no re~ons 
at alltf(Ne.ture II. 211). Thia is effec1tive argwnen". For if there are 
. 
reasona, it obviously cannot be $uthority in tbe usual s • ..- of the Yord. 
~a.ture, II, :na. 
IIbid., It Cha.pter X, "PI"agmatiam and Though"'," pp. 341-393. 
-
. a..The Fixation of nelief'," In Collected Po.p!rs of Charles Sanders 
rierce. edit&d by Charles Bartshorne ana Paul' weiss, v<i:r. S, (Cambrldg., 
Uo.ss.), 189. 
For the a.uthority po.ition maintains eit.her an ignorance of or absence of 
re ... ons. If it. choosos to say t.here are no roasons, this is perha.ps beyond 
criticism, although vulnerable to mook and scorn. For t.he consequences 
would be disastrous, besides being a viola.tion of experience. no.mely, if 
there are no reasons, then total and univeraal scepticism youid certa.inly 
be pos.ible.. But .omeone baa to be right and must be so by more than just 
pla.in luok. Hence, " ••• the unreasoning appeal t,o a.uthority is thus self-
destructlYG"(Nature II. 211). 
We might better se. the lack of ultimaey of the authoritarian position by 
oiting one of Blanabard'a example •• 
, 
Take a caae where the appeal to &athority would be most 
generally felt to be justified. SUppOSG some result is 
announced in quantum mechanics that. one does not in the 
leut understand; but one tenon tha.t, the equatioDs lead-
ing to it haft been worked out by Dirac, and have been 
checked and verified by Planck. Probably most of u. 
would accept their authority in the.e matters without 
hesitation. Dut ia our acceptance of their results based 
on their authority'? There is one reflection that is 
enough in itaell to d.atroT any such supposition. fbis 
is the fact that we could not 80 use their authority with-
out aa taplicit re~ from the authorities themselves. ~or 
if we did ultimately accept their results merely on their 
authority, we should be aeoepttng them on grounds which 
they themaelves YOuld rldicul..... lfllen PlanCK and Dirac 
accept certain results, they do not do 80 on the ground 
that their authority is 80 great and Infallible, they would 
regard this ... an absurd ground for belie..,.ing anything, and 
if we really rega.rd th •• as autborities, ft muat &ccept this 
authori t.atift abjura.tion of authority. If we uk Yhy they 
do accept oertain resulta, the answer is ..,.ery simple, given 
the conditiona, they kaye •• en the •• results to be n.cess~, 
and they are rea.dy to supply the' uta and t.he reasoning to 
anyon. who can folloy. In short, they do not take the.e 
t.hings to be true because tbey are ... thori ties; they are 
authorities because they can see th •• o tbing. to be tru •• 
And clearly, it press.d about the beliefs we &Ccept from 
them, we should agree that t.heir sort of ground is the only 
deoisive one"(Nature II. 226-221). 
This distinction between authority and the grounds or reasona tor being an 
authority are clearly aufficient material on which to indict the authority 
teet. we really believe that another person haa.a fullne •• and cleamee. 
ot insight which, if,... poa ....... it't YOuld rend.r the authorit.y teat, need.-
1.... Really, it ..... that the authority ~ppeal CAD b. reduced to thi., 
one regards eomething u t. ...... because _other pereon, "hoa. intellectua.l 
...... it,. in thie pariinlar fi.ld ia the Id.t competent, 11 ... atated aome-
thing to 1M Vue. We Plight qualify nlauhAri'. ft_rIca b7 noting the 1mpli-
eatiOJUJ of thi.. n_I,., u" .. lv to good authority i. aaother te.t. Au-
t.hority, in a sena., ma1 be " teat, but it i. not, t.he ultimate teat. 
Secondly, let us conalder verification by mywtieal intuition. Thi. 
method. of cour.e, i. not otten reaorted to, although it baa at taut a. 
historical lIIpor'M.nce. Examples " ... include aucb warrant for Tarious 
conTletio .. u CtWe to Socrate. through his demon. JOD of AN through her 
'Tole •• ', and George Fox through bis 'inner light' ... "(Nature 11. 221). 
Dlu.hard. in ranking ... n.te. ". "myetic, i. perhaps on disputed grounds,4-
but the ge •• rM intent of hie atat.cmeut about mystica hu a. good founda-
tion. Blanahard di.t~ilh •• three typea of myatic~1 intuition, according 
to the degree of ezplicitne •• of the truth apprehended and that which Yeri-
4lultou-Hermann Cltro.st, Soerate., !!!!.!!:!!~. (London, 1951) f p.18. 
In the first Idud, both the truth and t.ho verifying insil:~hts a.re in-
eff'll.hle or incapable of explanation. ItThe fllyStic comes doYn irma his i'lOtL'1t 
of vision sure tha.t hie oyes bave been opened to trutb without defect, but 
,lo1ploS8 to say Y!lft.t it is tha.t he has seen or what a.re tbe grounds of his 
!as8urtmce"(Nature n:. 221). To verify tha.t this happens, one need only re-
5 lea.ll 'tbe wealth of e:t!Wlples t,hat ,James ho.a e.asembled. To criticize tbis 
,:10t bo put into looguBge &ld therefore is beyond criticism or rational at-
!ta.ck. By the same token, bowever, there is no ,Eroot tht~t the mystic hy 
, 
7:"eo.ched such conclusive Tmowledge, .. • •• n.nd even if he had, it is clear 
rtlln.t we ,li.a.ve not" (~ature II. 222). It soems rather certain, hOlf'ever, tha.t 
rthe r.Jystic Dubean o.ctod upon. 
In the second type of mystic intuition, the veil iB alightly raised; 
the oystic ea.n nolt sa.y, with some precision, whn.t he hn.s seen-so~thing 
oJlout the nature of God, the soul, or the '1'rinity. But lIhBt is atill la.ck-
ing is tbe rationale that makes these beliet. 80 certain. rle cannot reMOl~-
3111,. deny, in these instMlces, tha.t the mystic's claim l1o.s basis, Il.lthougb 
we fail to partic ipa.te ill h is understanding. There mo.y be a real up..sis. 
But the ob;ject.iotl to this insight is that it is plagued with contradictory 
vien.G st. Theresa's report that she Y&S t;mde to comprehend, in one of 
51fiUia.m JatleS, 'ft. Varieties ot Religious Exerience, tlMysticism," 
lectures rlI aild l"VII,\il .... Yor!t, 19B). 
~~t\ture, II, 223. 
'I' '.1 'i 
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her visions, in wha.t va.y one God cOrn be in three Porsons, is clea.rly eon-
trruUeted by the cla.L"!II!I of Plottnus thnt God 'W'M Msolutely One, whom no 
pltU"l\lity could ri:.:::btly reprel1ont. 
Victor, on the other hand, received Mlotber certitude, tlm.t a.lthough liod 
lfM triune, this W'Il.. really eontrfl.ry ito reo-son; .:blb..r contradictory in-
stlVlces could be \'lultipU.ed in reGard to other instances-hlilortGtlit,. for 
eXlY1tplo. Certainly these exo.rnplee do not provido My unity among ·t.he mys-
they:..,.. and if 'll'hft.t they say give. any intimation of wha.t they mel'..n, it 
cuts Ern."M don!.)t upon the value of mysticism u a warra.nt for truth, For 
it is apparently Yil1ing to affix its seal, with royal ~partiality, to 
both sides of a contradlctlon"(Nature II. 924). 
III the third type of mystical inSight. hoyovor, Ye cerle.int,. have more 
of a ouis for considctration, For both the truth revealed to the mystic 
and the ground. of e.asurNlce are open tor inspection, nut it is nlanaha.rd's 
contention tha.t, such experiences are not ll1Ystice.l at 8.11, even thO~'J,;}l they 
ho.ve been talten M e:mmples, It If, in luch cMes, a truth 18 leen in ita 
relatioM to other knowledge, and 10 with something of the certainty tha.t 
goee 'With demonstration, it is no unique Mel myst.ical W"tU're.nt that gua.ro.n-
tees it, but mere coherence, the same sort of coilorence precisely tha.t is 
used in ~t3day Yerifications"(Nature II. 224). It nay only be an eXMnple 
of a more intensified and e~1ilarating feeling one experiences after wrest-
ling for a. long "hUe Yith a quite ponderous problem, 
HysticiSl'l, therefore, eitller offers no test, u in tho first instMce, 
or ends up supporting a:ontradictory claims, as in tbe second t:r:pe, or is 
plainly resolved into coherence. &8 in tbe third and l::tst typo. No test of 
truth is offered by mysticism of it.elf t or it it is, it is resolw)le into 
coherence. 
Three th.eories yet remain to be considered: correspondence, self-evi-
denee, L"ld coherence. Tbe foraer two seOl!l to gain t.he day in the CCi'!'l:lO!1-
Ilonse Yorld, depending UIlO1'l which gallery of knowledge one ho.P}JeM to be 
brOW'lting in. Correspondence with fa.ct seems to be the elect one wen deal-
ing vi th historical facts or events reported in tho newspapers. But if n 
re to cbo.nge the field of ImoYledge to logic or :natbemn.tical proof f the 
pla.in man would obviously switch fram correspondence to self-evidence Yith-
. 
out, besitation. For no correspondence with foot ia necesao.ry in t11e latt.er 
instances; they &1". self-evident. As YO .mGft from one field to tIle other, 
then, ye tind it neceslJf.U"Y to IInritch out tests of truth. For neither test 
ld be e.ll-incluive. As Dlanshard lIIaya, "Where i8 the; self-evidence 
in the judgement tba.t it rained yesterday in Guo.~nmla?"(~at..tlre II. 226) 
Thu, common sense does not. off~r e.ny consiatent teat. correspondence is 
elected for mat,tors of tact 8.l1tif self-evidence tor the abstract. Dla.Jl.Sho,rd 
holds, howeyer, t.hat this vll.riation in toats is only on the surface. F'cil" 
both correspondence and selt-evidenee eventually resolve into one 8tGnd~zd, 
coberonee. The Yay he propos.s to shoy tlli. ia ';)y establish.i:ng t.lm.t even 
in regard to mc,ttera of to.ct, it is coherence ra.ther than self-evidence. 
By t,hua bringing two such 0Pixu'dng tests under the i'mnner ot one, Bla.."l,J}la.rd 
C. Corresponclence ,nt.h Fact 
Pirst we \l"ill consider correspondence vith tu.ct. l-et us tll.I{e 8.8 an 
example, the etatc'I.'llcnt. 'Burr 1dl104 Hamilton i.n e. <':1\01'. It seems tha.t 
the tcpt, of this judgeme!lt is whet.her it, oorrospondl'l rith foot. nut upon 
reflect:icm, it ca., IJlainly be seen tha.t there is a confusion between nte1lJl-
S.ts truth WHlZ18 correspondence, 
tiO:l!8 a.ro distinct, and in sa.ying the,t the tost, bere is correspondence, :1(;: 
is pret.ty clef\rly confusing t.he test ot truth with its 1lKHming.. For the 
slightost considtn."$tion yill nllft' that the tlSe of correspondence a.a a test 
, 
irrecoV(\rably gone. Thero is no !)Eirson 1 iVing t'f'ho could n{'I,ve witnessed the 
f8.'ThoWJ du.el; and even if there wre. he could not, tbro~h correspondence 
ncr-ely, valid&'.te his memoriestf(~&ture II. 226-221). It seet:sa that in a.t-
tempting to verify such a st&tement,many other subsidiary judgements would 
tests the jud.ge~lent ia the extent of' our accepted lrorld that is implicated 
itIl it e.nd y('ulct lJecn.rrie' d()'Im 'With it it it felltfh~a.ture II. S21). 
It r:1l:l.y be objected, of course, tht&t eertl'\inly no diat:w..t put ev"Gnt 
is eternally mi.sing. However, in rega.rd to & pre.s:!}t judgement, the cor-
r~uJPondence test is relewnt.. For Elsa.mplo, in the aasertlon, 'tha.t hird 
is a ca.rdiual.' the test one would us. to detemine t.11e t.ruth of' the Mser-
tioD, yould bEr t.o 1001, end tl99. 'rbis yould yield t,r.lth or ta.Isi.ty. nut 
Dianslia.rd mo.in_ins, e.nd effectively, that this position o.seumes tha.t there 
is 0. 80lid cbunk of fa.et which ia presented to sense, which i. beyond doubt., 
and to Yhieh thought !llWIt correspond. But this is not toh. exact co.se. The 
ca.rdinal is not a mere aense datum. If we suppoae that an ani.mal stood in 
our stea.4, ". C&mlot affirm that the a.nime.l would recogniz. the cardinal as 
cardinal, or atf,a.ch the meaning ma.n would attaeb to tbe cardinali 
To recognize a cardinal is a considerable intellectual 
achievement, for to do it one must grasp, implicitly but 
none the Ie •• really, the ooncept of cardinal, and this 
ca.n only be done by a lea.p lar out of tile given into idea.l 
eluaification. The most ignorant person anwng us vho 
ubieves such recognition eould unpacK from it a sUJ"pris-
ing wealth of contents. The idea of living organisms, the 
thought of the bird kingdom and its outstanding character-
istics, the notlo .. of flight aDd a peculiar song and a deter-
minate colour--these and many other notions are 80 bound up 
with the identification that our thought would los. it.s character 
with the removal of anyone of them. Not that they are logical 
implication. 1rllioh later analysi. might find to be entailed 
by our identification, they are parts 01" component. of it, as 
truly as t plane t is part of 'plane tria.ngle t, they v. part 
of wh.at ". meu when YO use the yord tca.rdinal'. .And Mle •• 
... entia1 elementa, at least at the aame time ud tor the most 
part, are not given in sonse at all. ~ley are eloment.. in 3 
t.heol"Y, and a theory of no little complexit.y, which ia bued 
on sense dat.a. it you Yill, but could not possibly consist of 
them." (~tur. II. 889) 
Corr •• pondeDce with fact ••• ms to have a weak eue in the !nU.ial oourt 
hearing. The fa.ct that is supposed to correspond "ith tbe idea is consid-
erabl,. Yeakel" and more va.pid t.han expected. So long u the theory or idea 
goe. b$yond tbe tact, and it aeems that theery alwaY,S contains SOtllGthlng 
not given in a.nae, then oorrespondenee would aeem to have an insuperable 
difficul ty to overcome. It seems t.hat any theory cantaina further p0rcer>-
tions that go beyond the fact.a; and these perceptions are judgements. "nus 
tbe facts nth which our judgements were to tally seem forevEIr to elude us, 
a.nd we find ourselves in a region where, on overy side, thl9l"e are only 
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judgements and still more judgemente"(:Nat~..!. II. 229-230) It 
NoW' to &!'lyone yho o.dheres to tbe correspondence theory, Blansha.rd's 
object.ions would require clarification. For one thing, Dlanabard int.erprets 
the correspondence theory as meaning that there is B. one-to-one relation 
between idea and object. Rather, it seems that the correspondence theory 
propose. that the mind 1s aware that it is related to things. Althougb the 
intellect doe. Dot absorb the object materially, what it does absorb is 
related to what exiats physically. And the content that is a.bsorbed is 
.................... _-
abaorbed as rela.ted to the object. .A.s one advocate of correspondence put. 
----- . ..... 
it, nTh. intellect knOll'S ita own conformity to the object beca.use, in bo .... 
~ 1 ing its own knOwing, it knars its own relatedness to the object." In otl~ 
1I'Orda, the D:'ind does not have tyo separate acts of moying, i.e. it does 
not knOY the object and tllen the idea. In one act the mind aeizes the ob-
,ject, and in seizing the object, seizes its own relation to ttle object. 
Now is this different. from asserting that the mind cDrresponds to external 
things? It seems that those vbo defend the correspondence theory regard 
the correspondence not to be betveen the concept and the object, but he-
tween the judgement and the objective si tuo.tion tbat it grasps s one judges 
tha.t the concept is related to somet.hing objective. Renco, truth is in the 
judgement.S 
But certainly one other objection t.o the correspondence test is tba.t 
TF.». ,fUhel_en, lfautll ~owledGe .!! 'Realit.z, Prentico-llall., Inc., 
(Now York, 1958), p. 141. 
S 
.!2.!!., p. 148. 
the gi venness which is ued as one of the· terms, is or can be possessed by 
the illusory. fheperson who suffers from deluaions, delirium tremens, or 
hypnotic sU;;'T,gestion, reports his vivid perceptions; he, no 1.ss tban what 
In call a normal person, is experieneing something given in sease. They 
Ihe-ve facts to correspond to tbeir ideu, just u aurely u tbe most sane 
expositor of the correspondenee theory. However, .... will now turn to the 
self-evidenee tbeory. 
D .. Self-Evidence 
Self-evidence ia tbe second main opponent to the coherence theory. 
The truths of logic and mathematics seem self-evident. No search for evi-
4ence outside t.ho context of sucb propositions seems necessary. In fa.ct 
it really soems stupid to co.rry on SUCll 1;\ search II Even some ethical man-
dates, auch a.a to do the greB.ter good ratber than le8s, seem self-evident. 
nut. over and abo .... the appe.rent certitude tha.t self-evidence brings, there 
have been, historically, many propositions tartan as self-evident which hOove 
actua~ly turne. out to be fnolse. If sueb .. test eM leo.d to error, when 
fairly applied, then it ia untrustvorthy &nd not 8. te$t at all. But a.a we 
shOo!1 8ee, error not only plagues self-evidence, but collerence and corres-
pondence a.a well. EXMlples are found in any field. tffhe judgement 'an eye 
for 1m eye and 0. tooth for 0. tootb' no doubt appeared self-evident to em-
~ient Jewry. Before Galileo it seemed self-evident that heavier bodies 
iWould fall luter thM lighter ones. The philosophy of ca.usa.tion he.s S1m.nned 
~ith assertion. supposed to be self-evident, -every event must haTe a e~ 
and a.n effect t J 'the effect cannot be greo.ter than the cause'; • two things 
13 
iYith nothing in COllDOn ca.nnot interact t J 'not.hing can a.ct where it is not·. 
lDut to many philosophers all of these sta.tementa ha.ve seemed either ques-
tionable or downright talse"(Nature II. 238-239). fiistorically, it seems 
that no statement ho.s been regarded as self-evident without meeting with 
opposition. Of course one may object that some things are not seifoOiOf)vi4ent 
to &11, that mach that i. self-evident may b9 difficult to discover. To 
JUt.y, bowewr, tbat 'What is .elf-evident to one person, but not self-evt4ent 
to an equa,lly competent person, does not explain a.nyt.bing. 
But let us go to the very capital itself, namely, to what are conai ... 
dered the most indubita.h~y certain propositiolUl, ad see what Dlanahard 
. 
finds there. There are, under this hea.ding, a distinetion bet ..... n axioms 
and logical laya. AJcioms, at tbe outset, seem to be rather _o.k, for even 
!mathematioians no longer agree that they are self ... vtdent. Thay are in-
a'Ma.d calling them • postulates , or primitive propositions.' The current 
tendency is to dlaavO'l' any claim to the .elf .... vidence of the primitive pro-
positiona from which 'tbeir aeienee m&T be eon.trUGted by a long series of 
logical deductions. Moreover, what is logica.lly prior or postulated in one 
iScience may be derivative in another. I1.nri Poincare beld that mOlll8 were 
neither empirical nor self-evident, rather, they were convention. whoae en-
ployotent Ya.8 dictated by consistency. tt.!!!! ~eometrie .!!! ..i2!!!!.e! etre plus 
t) 
vraie qut~e autre, elle peut .~ul.ment .!.!!:! lalus commode." The impl! .... 
. . 
tion is that one axiom i8 regarde. as true, not because of self-evidence, 
ibut becall8& of the network of relationa it maintains lfith otitel" propositions 
thin a system. Try ma.tdng, for e:mmple, 2 plus 2 equal anything but 4. 
If 2 plus, 2 were 5, 1 plus 1 would not be a, and then 1 would not be 1, 
in tact not a single number or relation between numbera, would remain what 
it ia, all arithmetic would gO"{Nature II. 244). This line of defense cer-
tainly takes WI beyond •• 11 ....... i4&nc.. It really is appealing to coherence, 
we finel, and tha.t. any proposition, whether it. likes it or not, is bound up 
nth .. syatem. When uy proposition is .. serted, .... are really a.aaerttng 
its relation or connection ritll a. su'b-syatem.. I1The proposition about the 
sUlfa rising :1. now rejecte., 'Why? Becaue it contU.cts with our e.ta.bU.~d 
system of astronomy.... Tbe judgement tha.t nothing comes from nothing ba.a 
all physical acience behind it., but still in the m:1nd of the average man 
it is a little le.s than certain because b .... ring on the outskirts of hi.' 
science is the wra.ith of another system, atill vaguely inviting, in which 
miracle. were frequent, and creation from nothing was accepted fact"(Nature 
II. 241). Thus the certainty attained by self-evidence ia, contrary to 
opinion, attained througb a gradual process of mustering together a cumula-
tive mound of material into a syst.em. Once this system hy been 80 con-
atructed. each part is necessitated by the other. It is only then th&t 
-
one may say, perbaps arbitrarily, that this or that proposition i8 true or 
self-evident. 
The second of the twin cit~el. for self-evidence 1a the logical lay. 
there any self-evident axioms in logic? Apparently, the Sl'WG diffic\\l-
toy that beset axioms plagues logical laws also. Not only haa the self-
evidence of axioms been discarded, but. more recently the self-evidence of 
logical lad baa come within the orbit. of doubt by some of the leading 
logicians of our day. 
If there are many 10gicitms of high competence (end no one 
'Would den,. tbis cha.racter to Messrs. Rwtsell, Whitehead,or 
Lewis) who consider that the Ian ot traditiona.l logic are 
no more self-evi4ently true than a veriety of nlternative 
la .. which the,. are ready to supply, that in itself is a 
Significant a.rgument. It is an argument that stUI bolds 
whetber their belief that there are alternative logics is 
right or Yl"'ong. For the belief that there carmat be aU,9r-
nati ... logics is .apposed to be lIutlf-eviden'i, a.nl 'While n 
cannot demand that ~lat is self-evident be so, still if 
one'. assertion is denied by tbe moat competent of expert., 
the insistenee upon its certainty, amounting as that does 
to the obarge that onetaopponente are myopic about tbe 
simplist of logical lan, suggests something les8 than tbe 
open mind. If eyes I ike these cannot .ee what n sa,. is 
there, whose eyes are better"(Nature II. a52)? 
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Wo migbt note that Dlanshard seems to be malting an appeal to the a.utbo-
rlty test in the above instance, i.e., authority soems to be the criterion 
for doubt and tberefore for the truth of' the doubt, Md therefore for the 
oriterion of truth. But this may just be eo quibble over style. The above 
argument, then, is Dot so muoh an argument, a.a an indication that there .!! 
an argument against t.he self-evidence of log! cal le...... Dleshard, honnr, 
does more than suggest tbat there i. an argument. When". emmine logics.l 
l."ws more caretully, we ma,. find that the character they possess is 80 simi-
Iv to self-evidence, tha.t they ga.in credit for being self-evident. That 
common character is this I any logica.l 1 .. " which is regarded u ultimate 
is incapable of denial only insofar as one remains yithiB the context of 
ita system. . For example, to deny the principle of contradiction is to say, 
of course, t.hat the law is false, not true. Dut in doing this, fine needs 
to employ the principle which is being denied. i.e., in trying to refute 
the principle of contrfMiiction, one 'WOuld have to suppose it. O.e YOnders, 
however, if there could be a 8lstem of tbought in which the principle of 
!I 
contradiction woul4 not bold. Dla.nahard aeea to suppoa. that the princi-
ple of contradiction is present to some systems and not present to otbers. 
It wou14 seem that such .. principle governs all thought, not just certain 
aystems. In emyevent, Bla.nshardts argument is. ".!! the lay of contra-
diction holds, then within the system governed by it oven the assertion 
that it does not hold assumes that it does. The incoherence ia between the 
principle ot the syst-em and the cont.ent of a proposition supposed to be 
made within itM(Natu.re II. 253). Thu., again s.lf-evidenee, on the score 
of logical laws, talla ultimately upon systemAtic coherence for its validi-
ty. 
, 
'1'his expoaition of tbe teats of truth haa be.n 0. },3ther negative and 
roundo.bout trea.tment. But ft think it bas a.t least pointed out the main 
a.lternativea to the eoherenee theory, and, lIOn importantly, sbo .... tba.t 
Yha.t draYing poYer th.s. theories bave, is ultlmatel1 to be attributed to 
coherence. What haa been sa.14 about the other theories was Dot said for 
purposes of refutatlon or rejection, but merely to shoy that their virtue 
lie8 in the virtue of coherenee. t.ha.t they may be true, but their truth 
lie. in their inclusion in coherenee .. tbe la.at court of appeal, and that 
only coherence can bring together snoh diver.. theories as corre.pondenoe 
and aelf-evidence.10 We noy turn to a aimilar. but diatlnct, question, 
that regarding the nature of truth. 
E. Coherence &8 the Na~UJ". of Truth 
Bla.nshard bas 80 far been considering the VlU"'ioWIJ tests of truth and 
6T 
u found that all wst. converge into tIle one teat of coherence. TIli. 
oe. not nece •• a.rily mea.n, boftv ... , tbat coheNnce is the nature of truth. 
or tllere are two di.tinct questions concerning truth. One may reject. co-
ereuce as tile na.ture of truth, whUe accepting coherence u the ~ of 
ruth. One thing ma.y be • geed indication of scmething W'hile remaining 
ite di.tinet from it. Pleuure -1 be a.n accura.te index to the volume 
f geed in experien.e. but this doe. not necessarily entail the identifi-
ation of· pl.uure 'lfltJ1 goodne... Similarl,., coherence may give 'WJ an &C-
urate test of truth, while not being ·t;he nature of it. We are concerned 
0'1' "ith thia queation. Is coherence like"ise tb. nature of trutb? Is 
Blanaha,rdta vi"f of coura., ia tha.t truth is coherence. In fact 
hi •. is implicated in hi. treatment of the idea. Fw, 'ha.t coherence i. 
ruth rests upon tIle doctrine of the rela.tion between reality and thought. 
,'e Yill now recall that cloctrine of the idea and clrall" out the implieatiolUJ 
. , 
from it regarding truth. 'fhen .... rill consider aome of the main objections 
tJlis theory. 
ADy thinking pro •• ss is unclertak.n in order to understand. This goal 
t understanding ia & distinotive actlvity~f the min4 which strives for 
systematic grasp of reality, to apprehend one unknown tIling as related 
eees.vi1,. to something &lre&4,. Imcnm. We Yiah to establish a. bridge be-
tween our mainland ancl man,. unscouted islands at .ea. 'fhis bridge may be 
!ther c&U8al, teleological, or geometrical, but in any case it is ayatema-
tic. It is really an a.ttempt to assimilate the alien into our continent, 
into one homogenous whole, to incorporate the man,. sub-e7Btema into the 
as 
larger syst.em. Thia is what understanding is. But ... bat if what satiafiea 
thonght actually faUs to conform to the real 1I'Orld? Wha.t guarantees that 
'What rq ideu form should be tl"Ue? ftere, of .OUl"s., the problem 'tfaIJ con-
siderably complicated if w conceiTed thought and reality as related only 
esternall,.. For knOYledge would he only luck 01" frUltl. But aft.er ". rid 
ourselves of the .... ak analogi •• which oauses this dubious relation--cop,y 
and original, stimulus and organism, and lantern-screen, then ". have 3 dif-
, , 
ferent answer, and that anawer was that to think i. to get a thing, at 
least partially, within the mind. Thought is related to the perfect ful-
fillment of a purpose.11 
, 
Two en" of thought tho emerged, an immanent a.nd a trans 0 en dent end. 
Thought seeks both the satisfaction of systematic viaion and the fulfill-
ment b it. object. Blanahard oontended tha.t these enda "el"O identical 
if fmOYledge "808 t.o be possible at all. "If the pUl"8uit of thought •• own 
ideal yere merely an elaborate self-indulgence tllat brought us no nearer 
to reality, or if the apprehension of reality did not Ii. in the line of 
thought.s interest, or atill more if both of the.e beld a.t onee, the hope 
of knowledge "oold be vain" (WatUl"e II., ae.). It •• mu evident, then, tha;t 
Blauhard holda the tUstinotionlet".en mind and enemal realit,.. It also 
see. olear that thought and realit.,. .!! Im~ are ideBtioal. 'fbis, .... take 
it., Is Ybat ia meaDt. by the identification of the immanent. end and the tran-
scendent end. Upon refle.tion .... found that inaofar u the tnuanent end 
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dent end also. That these two ends are identical is assumed in every act 
of thoughtt For "To tbinI, is to raise a question, to raise a quostion is 
to Beek an .xplanation, to se.k an explana.tion is t.o assume that one may be 
hadJ so to uaume 18 to take for granted that nature in tha.t region is in-
tel1igtble"(Natnre II. 183). It the two do not coincide, then thore is ab-
solutely no point in dl.cusing knowledge at all. Coh .... nce is founded on 
the principle that they are identioal.IS 
This natuaally provides a hint as t.o tile structure of' rea.lity. Tha.t 
bint i. tbat re .. 1ity is 8yet,ematic. order.4 and inwlliglble, " ••• with 
1f.~ich thought in ita advanoe is more ead more identifying its.lf.... And 
, 
. ' 
if we take this vie", oW" notion of truth 18 .,-ked out for U$. Trutb is 
tbe a.pproximation (a stage of ... aU.sation) of tbOllght to realit.y. It is 
thought on ita tra.y home. Its _unre ia t.he diata:nce thought bu travelled, 
under guidMceof it •• inner compass, tOYat·d that intelligible system which 
unite. it. ultimate object with i\8 ult.imate end. Rence at. any given time 
the degree of truth in our esperience as a whole is the degree of system 
it. haa o.ehieved"(Jf!ture II. 2(4). But we should perhaps be more explicit 
about. just what coberenoe Mana. It cannot, as DIMshard says, be fully 
defined. beeause it. is an ideal t.ha.t 11M nev.ar been completely achieved 
0.1 tbougll it is immanent in our tbought. Coherence t fully achieved. would 
be knowledge in which every judgement necessitated, and was neoeasitated 
by, a complete syst.em. Most probably we never find such a system nth so 
lIIbid., 163. 
-
TO 
It systematic coherence. For in the everyday run of life n are usually 
satisfied with tlte a.eldevement of a fey sub-systems. 
We accept the demonstrations of the geometer as com-
plete, and do not think of reproaching him because he 
begins with postulates and leaves us at the end with' 
a system that is a sl,eleton at the best. In' physics, 
in biology, above all in the social sciences, ft &re 
satisfied with less still. We test judgements by the 
amQunt of coherence which in that particular subject-
matter it Hems reasona.ble to ex:pe ct. We apply, per-
haps uncons.iously, the advice of Aristotle, and refra.in 
from asking demonstration in the physical sciences, 
while in mathematicals ye refuae to accept less. And 
such faet.a may be thought to sltOY that 'ft make no actu-
al use of the ideal standard just described, but however 
UlUCh this standard may be relaxed within the limits O'f 
a particular acience, its influence i. evident in the 
grading of the 8cienee. generally. It ~ precisely in 
those aciences that approa.eh most ne&rly to' system as here 
defined that". aohieve the greatest certainty, and preCisely in 
those that are most remote from such system that OUl" doubt is 
veatest, Yhet.h.r ... bave achieved scientific trut,h at all. 
Our blaedia'te esa.etions shift vith the aubject-matter, our 
lUtf.t:'.i&tts1um4a.rd is unvvying." (Nature II. 866) 
point, then, Is not 'Whether ". a.ct,ually have the system in which every-
thing implica'tes everything else, rather, it seems that wbat truth we dO' 
ave is c.,herence. and if that. p&l"tial s,..tem ". nO'w have yere expanded, 
it would exptm4' int.o &. larger, all..oembraeing system. Once coherence is 
accepted as the test of truth, hoyevert this makes a commitment about the 
ature of truth and reality. For to say, for example, that reality is in-
coberent, while tbe wey Ye deal with it is through. coberent systems of ideas 
is certainly abs~d. If coherence is the test of truth, then reality it-
self' must be coherent. lflla.t about the natm:f! of truth? sOme pbilosophers 
hold coherence as the t.est of truth while simultaneously entertaining cor-
respO'ndence as its nature. BUt if coberence is the tUtt, then tt ••• we 
must use it everywhere. ,\Va must therefore use it to' test the' suggestion 
11 
t.hat truth.!!. otber tblm coberence. But if \'fe do, we shall find tha.t we 
MUst reject. the suggestion M loading to incober-enco"(Na.tw:~ II. 270). For-
e:m.mple, if a.fter- the accepta.nce of coherence aa the test of truth, one 
denies it is tbe natur-e of tMlth and instend chooses correspondence, the 
rollning incoherent consequenoes oocw". We shall quote Dla.nsbard in full 
on this point • 
••• it one holds that truth is correspondence, one 
cannot intelligibly hold either tba.t it is tested by 
coherence or thtl,t there is any dependable t.st at 
n.ll. Consider- the first point. Suppose tha.t we con-
strue experience into the most coher-ent picture pos-
sible, remembering tlmt N:long the elements included 
viII be such secondary qualities as colours, odours, 
l\Ud sounds. Would the mere fe.et that 8tJch elements 
as these are coherently arranged 1)r-ove tltat anything 
precisely corresponding to them exists .out there'? 
I cannot see tba.t it "ould, even if .... Jmmr that the 
two arrangements had closely corresponding patterns. 
If on one aide you have a. s.r-ies of elements ••• and 
on the other a aeries of element •••• arranged in pat-
terns that correspond, you have no proof as yet that 
the nrn.tures of these elementa oor-respond. It. is thore-
for-o Impossible to argue from a hieh degree of coherence 
yit.hin experience to it.a correspondence in t.he sa.oe 
degree yitll a.nything out.ide. And this difficult.y is 
tyt)ical. It you place the nature of truth in one aort of 
character Rnd it.s test in something quite differ-ent, you are 
prett.y certain. sooner or later, to find the two f~lling 
apart. In the end, the only fAst of truth tbat is not 
l::1ialeading is the specia.l nature 01" cha.racter tha.t is 
itself constitutive of trut.h. (~ II. 268) 
The second difficulty, namely, tha.t. there would be no de~dable test ~t. 
all if coherence is the test but. not t.he nature of truth, is thiS, if cor-
respondonce is truth, t.hen one would have to get a.t the fact in order to 
Imow tbat it does correspond to eXp0r-ience. But one cannot get at any fa.ct 
whicb is not glossed with idee, in some degr-ee, in order to compa.re the tyO 
sides. Such fact, we have 80en e~rliert is not ucessible. "When we try 
11'1' I ,
11!'!,i 
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to lay hold of it., what va find in our Ila.nde is a judgement which is obvi-
ously not itself tbe indubitable tact. we are seeking, t\nd which h'lWrt bo 
~hecJ, .. ad by SOtelO fact beyond it. To this process thoro is no end" (Na.tuTf!, 
II. 268). nonce we are ineluctably driven to Cohal-once in atterilpting t,o 
[explien.t.e the hp..sis for correspondence. E~.r(tn if the a.ttain."l1ent of fact did 
~iV& us truth, t.ho truth would no longer eonsis"::' of correspondence of the 
idee. with fact. For 'We eM 0;)111 imow the fa.ets throUf~b our ideas, and tha.t. 
~nMBha.rd bolda, pla.ces us square witbin tbe rea.bt of coherence: "The argu-
pent t., usume coherence a. the teat of truth, and JOU will be driven by 
!the incoherence of your a.lterna.tive8 to the conclusion that it is also the 
pa.t.\u-e of trutlt" (Na.ture II. 260'. 
To further explicate n.nd justtty t.he theory tha.t truth consists in co-
,.orence, ve rill now conaider some of the object.ions. For the theory haa 
"een attacked inSOf.le length, n.nd so by courting opposition 'Ire fla.y vie" the 
...... ·l·dit f I i 1" rot ... - 13 '" .... ]. Y 0 co Ierence n many 1.6,1_ • 
F. Objections to the Coberence Theory 
One objection is that the coherence thoory enta.ils scepticism in that 
~ complete and all-mc1ui" sys·tom. is 80 obviously beyond us t\S to be im-
;H).sible. Nov if to !m01l' something is true ts to bov it ill a. system, them 
~ne CM nover know if some one thing is true through failure to :i.10SSCSS the 
13 Ibid.,S09. 
-
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I 
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systoc. BIN1sbe.rd admits that coberence does entail a. certain &mount of 
scepticism with regard to both present and most probably all f~ture know-
ledge. Al th(nl!:;~b this may be di.appointing, it is not disastrous. For in 
the light of historical science, .... find many discarded ahsolute certitudes. 
And this suggests not th.at 'truth 1f'l\8 defined wrOl1g1y in regard to the dis-
carded certainties, but that mt\U has limde mistct.kes in defining its present 
cha.ra.cter. 'l'he coherence theory, then, needs to be a.pplied with common 
sense. For tbe system is alvays less tl'l1:m the 'Whole possible syst,ellll 
f ••• at the best it is the mass of scientific JQlowle~e bearing on the 
point in question; on the average it is a cl!udy congar!es of memories, 
suggestions Bad inferences, ill-organiaed in the extreme, ~d :yet capable 
of subconscious mobilisation and use. .And for all of us, except in rare 
the interest in truth is satisfied by exercise within these limits. 
scientist i. commonly satisfied if hi. theory receives the impri-
tor of the organized knowledge of his time, and he would think it fantas-
tic to attack him on the ground that or~anized knowledge has been known to 
cha.nge, tha.t it may do so &ga.in, and henee tba.t his theory may ha.ve to 
cha.nge 'With it"(Nature II. 211). But to be extensively effected by the 
possibility of change is rea.lly an introduction to scepticis~. We do not 
eed to reject truth beca.use .... do not ha.ve it in the absolute. An a.rtist 
does not refuse some beauty to a YOrk of art because it fails to achieve 
14 
Vltat llla.nshard 111 in need of bere Is a distinct.ion beti\1'"en limited but cor-
rect and compreitenaive !mowledge. What Imowled,ge we do have, even though 
~imited, may be correct without being comprehensive. The objection of seep-
rt.iciam, then, seems to be ad~'tlUately 8DBYered. 
is that coherence alloys for truth t.o cb&1.ge. But, it is said, 'truth can-
not. change, once true a,l"aya true, OIld coherence Bol1on t.bat what is true 
DOW may la.ter be talse.' Now wha.t coherence means is that in the practica.l 
order t.he coherence atMdard is the present system of knowledge as appre-
bended by a. part.icular person. What changes ia mants a.pprehension of the 
, 
system., or, more precisely, the system. o.ny part.icular man ca.rr! •• wit.h him 
changes, not the goal. Our kno"led:::;e of truth changes, usually in aD ex-
IP&Dding progression. "Bet.ween a t.ruth that is itself invariant and 'Val7ing 
~egree. ot manif •• tation of this truth, there is no sort of inconsiatency" 
~B&ture II. a12). 
Then t.here are some crit.ics who have t.ried to reduce coherence t.o cor-
respondence. POI" wben the advoca.tes of coheronce say that. the truth of a 
[proposit.ion is m.easured by it.s approximation to an a.bsolute ayatem, some 
feel the word 'approximation' constitutes a surrender to correspondence. 
But Dlushard makes it clear that the "ord tapproximation' doea not mean 
copying, or a one-to-one rela.tion, nor a.n Mcorde.nce. Ratl1el", u he stated 
concerning the theory of tbe idea., it i8 ttle rela,tion of tllte partially ful-
filled purpose t.o eo completely fulfilled purpose. It ••• think of the re-
la.tion bet".en seed and. flo".r, or botRen the s,]jpling and the tree. Does 
ft,he sapling corres,)ond to the tree that emerges from it' If you say it 
r 
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does, .... shall agree that a _ystem of thought may corre.pond t .... a.lit.,.. 
It, CUI .... fv more 11ItOly, you .a,. it doe. not, and that t.o ue tcone-
_pondence' of 81Mh a relation i. contulng, then you are at on. "ith us in 
.on.i .... ing 'corre.pondence' a misde.cription of the relation .... ha .... in 
ind"(Natve II. ITWT.). 
Other. may take the cumtrvy 'Vi .... an4 attempt to reduoe coherence to 
elt .. rld ... e tor the tollowiag .... ona. When". .e. tbat one propo.itiOD 
ithin a .y.tem i8 true, .. aee that it 1. nece.sitated by other proposi-
tion .... ithin t.he 8yatem &1Id i. theNfer. self-evident. But self-evidence 
an. the s.lf-evideDOe of l!:0p?aiticm., ir".pecrU .... of "la:~i0D8 that 
the propositio .. may have with otbel"8. The poaition of self-evidence 8a.,. 
hat. 1DUl7 propoaitiOlUJ can b. aeen. to be true in Iso1a.tion from others. 
ohereM., _ the floatr..,., 8ay. that. no proposition CaD .,. ••• n to be true 
In i •• lation. Rather, it i. only becaus. of some relation Yith oth ... pro-
poaitina that _1' €Ii ...... pnpuit.ion is tru.. A.t any ra .... this maeh a.o .. 
l.arl Coberenee eamt.t be redtteed to selt ... ..,.idene. it tb. latter ,.aitia 
tatai .. tbat 8. gi.-. propo.ition may be true lndependen.tly ot othera. 
eeOlWll,., it •• ll ... ridonoo ... 0111d maintdn that & gi ..... n proposition Is a.lt-
vident bee.... it 1. relat.4 to otho .. propositions, then it i. clearl,. 
peaking the 1~ • • t eob.".... and th ..... yould be n. major ditt ........ , 
hi •• bjeotion, then, 1. either baa.d on & eoat .. ioa or really ldeatltle • 
• It .. Tid .... with the oohereno. theory. 
A more fl'equent (aDd probabl,- more impor1.u.t) objeotion which ooherenoo 
neoURtera i. tho .h&l"~ that eohe ... ue 111.\,- be pre.ent without tnth. HOY 
aD e.he ...... b. pr.se.t &1ld atUl tall ... ld. of truth? Doubtle •• toh .... are 
T6 
tn'lany different. systems of geometry, ea.eh of which i .... internally coherent 
as the o~ler. But .inee they are inoompatible, only one of them can be 
true. Nevertheles., if coherence eonstltutes the nature of truth, are we 
not obligated t.o regard t.heIll all 8 true? Or, to take a. more concrete ex-
ampl •• there are, obviously, many different philosophie., theologies, hi •• 
toriea, e.to _. which are mutually ineonatstent. "'hai, then, is the criteria. 
by "hich we can be sure of the attainment ot truth' Blanshard's theory, 
~ile not specifically treating the ObjectioD, nevert.hele.s answers it 
decisively, or at leut ve shall endeavor to explicate the implications 
Which coherence haa on t.his point. We must recall that any discussion of 
, 
thought invol.... two ends-rm' buanent. end and a. trau8cendent. end. Both of 
thes. enda are releva.nt t.o the discussion of truth. This is to say cate-
gorically again t.hat coherence does not simply involve .. idealistie con-
struction, or a. web of thinking "ith perfect internal consistency. For". 
youtd then be dea.ling esolus1ft!,.- Ylt.h the iDlD8illent end al.-, Therefore, 
it ". are to fairly eaamine coherenee, we must simultan.oualy discus truth 
u including both innaneBt and tranaceD4ent ends, both subject and obj"t, 
both intel"D&l and. external reference.. It thi. i. done, th.n a road to the 
solution of thls object.ion is 4learly open. 
The solution begin. in the following f .. hiont If the immanent end is 
st.r1'Ylag t.o uhi..... the tranacendent ~md. it thought i. worJdng to identify 
l"ell with the external or with the transcendent, then oan we reasonably 
aaAert that in identifying its.lt with the esternal, thought would actually 
~ifest it.elt inconsistently or produce conflicting identifications of 
" 
the tl"aD'cend.ent' 'fbat is, CWl we reuonably belieYe that truth yould be illl 
11'1 
'11:1 
i'l: 
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e. series of conflicting coberent reports? The MSyer. I feel,18 po.radox1-
ea.l. Yes ruld no. Yes, we eM "tWel' ma.ny.confU.ctlng reporta, or many con-
flicting coherent reporte. No, because. if we aece2t &11 of the conflicting 
systems as equa.lly va.lid, then Ye you!d eventua.lly have t.o suppose that the 
transcendent end, to which the immanent end is striving to identify itself, 
ia ill.cohereXlt, contradictory. In tha.t ce.se, thought would be striviag to 
identify itself with a monstrum, a fickle creature a.t that. We youid have 
to suppose that the trana(;endent 1¥'U e. citizen of 0.11 countrys, a. pra.etio-
ner of all. trades, e. Jew wbo ltU It. Christian with black. skin which e.ppeared 
raite vhile worshiping Dud4he.. 
, 
We must suppose, then. that reality is coherent. And if reality is 
leoheHBt, then t.ruth must be coberent, the i.n'Inanent end muat be ~ system 
iwhick YUhea to become one wlth the one rea.lity. We mo.,. thu t\Ccount for 
the absence of truth when coherenee ia present, by sa.ying that (and ,... think 
this obvioWJ) to rega.rd coherence u truth ri thout making reference to eSl-
-
lPer·ien.,e or the external 1s absurd. To .peek of coberence vbile complete1,.. 
disregarding e~~rience youid never lead One to truth, precisely because 
trutll invol'ns ..22!!!. the inmelutnt and the trUUlcendent. lfe muat, neverthe-
lesa, admit tha.t it is difficult. to determine, according ",0 Dianahard's 
ewalysi., which ot t.wo ceherent _:rstems. both of which bact reference to 
experience-to the tran8cendent-Yere true.. The only B.nl!nlrer lteems t.o be 
this. That syst.em ia true Yhicb is more coherent, vhicb .!2!:!. r:eadi1Z .!.!,-
Iheres with the many 8u'b-systema of knowledge. Of any two unequal systems, 
!We choose the more oomplete, u. i. e_mplifie~l by -n.king from dremas I by e.n 
examination of the historica.l supersession of beliefs, and by an ano.lYld .• 
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pi educa.ted j\l~nts.14 It is contended here, in agreement with Dla.nshard 
tbat the notion of t'tro e.ll-inelwdve aysteil1lil is !eaningless, because not 
possible, B..?ld "bere there a.re two systems less tha.n e.ll-inelusive, the more 
coherent, one gains the do.y. Briefly, then. we may disclaim this objection 
iby simply sta:t.ing tha.t coherence of necessity involves tyo terms. one m:se.-
Inent and one transcendent. "'here there is only one term spoken ().f, fmd we 
think the present objeetion ts guilty of this, there is no colterence, but 
~ tntern~l eonsi8te~cl without 0. transcendent reference. 
There ia an inherent do.nger in the coherence theory, to consider 000-
thor objection, tbat it mo.y be interpreted as circular. This has been answ-
ered implicitly elsewhere, but deserves separa.te &Dswer. The objection 
tmainta.in. that each member or proposition of fA system is accepted as true 
because it eoheres with the others or, more precisely, because each member 
impli.cAtes eaeb other. For en.mple, the reyon why .! 1s true is because it 
coheres witb.!., and.!. ill t.rue beeaWle it coheres with.!_ This is a circle, 
beca.uae each leo.nll on the other, and to know that one is true we must a.lyays 
have to revert to the ot.her. Noy this seems to contain some merit, but it 
is based on a confusion_ Part ().f the rea.son why one theory is accepted 
as true is beea.use it coberes with another eleroont. nut one elerlent is not 
tbe complete eo.nse or the truth of another element. nut Olle eoo clel"..rly 
recognize here en instance of mutual eMsality. One can llOrilaps see this 
;in the folloring eJQUlplet "Consider the two propositions (1) that certa.in 
neandert.ha.l skulls belong to a prinitive human type, {2) that the hard paint 
on the rim of the ea.r, and nea.r the top, is the vestige of a.."'1 early origiMl 
15x,To.ture, II, 286-288. 
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tip. Sta.nding alone, either 9£ these proposU,ions would he disputo.hle in 
the extreme. Sta.nding, as they a.etW!.l1y do, in an enormous nbwork of the 
tf.\Cts' co-ordino.ted by the theory of evolution, each(we teke it) is over-
"'helmingly proba.ble. This proba.bility ia not a.n inference from the truth 
of 't.be other, nor even t.m inference from the 8YS~Jem, tal!:ml tuJ independontlz 
true"{Na.ture II. 2S1-aSB). Tbe coberence helongs to the relation, not to 
one nf the elements in isolation. 'l'herefore, the coherence tIleory is not 
a deductive typo of reMoning, nor is it circular, that. is, 8.BSUtling one 
element M true, -then leaning several other elements upon its support.15 
~ohorence does maintain tba.t the system is ideally perfect, tlla.t ea.eh ele-
, 
,lent necess i te. tea eaoJ1 other. Noy even though !'lI:Wy admit that every \Occur-
once is related to s(H<Jethincr else, they would not care to a.drJit tha.t ever;r-
thing is necesna.rUy rela.ted to everything else, or tha.t a differenco in 
the coherent sys::em of relatiou would 'be reflect.ed EnroryW'bore else. We 
can give tW eXllmple from which a, universal e:"tro.?olation would be quite pos-
siblea 
Suppose 1 climb tho hill be~lind my ftU"[l:l h<'.)Uso in 
Ver'30nt and look across at Mount Wa.sbingt.on. I 
Ml wearing a. felt hit' at tho time. Is it sensi-
ble or quite 8~ to argue tha.t if I had worn a 
stray hat instead, tha.t fa.ct would ba.ve made a 
difference to Mount Washington' I not only believe 
it "II"Ould, but that tbe argument 1'01' th.i.s (:o.u:lu&ion 
is strong almoat to the pOint of de~nstration. 
In outl:u~e it is as lolIon: my putting o:u this 
pM"ticular hat baA Cl1l.uses, wtdcb la.y in part in 
the wrkings of rJj brain; "i;,he$$ "Itorld.ngs also 
he.d causa., Yhich lay in part in the workings of 
othur bodily organs; theS!e. ire turn d<lpended UIJon 
15". 4-ra'l~ure, 
cOl.U1t.les. physioa.l factors in the wo.y of food, air, 
light, IlJ3id temp{>rn.ture, everyone of which 111),d its own 
cOll.ditioDe. It is plain tlmt before YO tOOrt ~nMl:r steps 
i'1 this retreat, ,re should find ourselves involved in 
mlllions of condlti'lns, and tho.t if we wore a.hle !.!!: 
iti1:aS8EdlO to travorse a.ll the diverr:;i1'lg branches, there 
110n dO proba.bly be 110 region of the univorsG tha.t yould 
renmin Ullp0Dotrated. (Nature II. 293) 
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This of course offers no proof that all the events yore related causally or 
logically necossitated. But if they are ca._ally related, t11eo certainly 
the difference in the one event would be reflected in the other event and 
cauae. This contention, hoyever, that everything is related, is not equi-
~lent to as.otting thn.t everything ia equally relevant to one event. If 
everything were equa.lly relevant, then the pla.in ... ertfon that 'it rained 
yesterday,' vOllld involve the ludicrous rejoinder that 'Aristotle is not 
alive.' To admit relev~ee here is not to adnlit an equal degree ot rele-
vance. It is necessary to distinguish, as traditionally has been done, be-
tyeen -the essential o.nd the &ccldental, between t.he causative and the con-
16 ditional. 
This brings us to the last considera.tion of thia thesis, the degrees 
of truth anti coheronce. lfe hQ.V'G reached tbe point ""dere coherence seems to 
involve a matter ot degree. Any proposition viII be true to the extent in 
~trhicb it. ia necessitated, a:ad i:1eeessita.ted to the ext.ent to Ybiilh it is 
true, JHoneho.rd mainta.ins that since n. complete necessity 1t'111 never be 
at.tained " ••• no truth rill be quite truo, nor will any false proposition, 
provided it bas Itteaning at all, \)e a.bsolutely false"(Nature II. 3(1). Tids 
doctrine of the degrees of truth is quite e.sential to the cbherence theory, 
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specially sinee many have found it to be one of the mejor difficulties to 
its acceptance. 
G. Deg..... of Truth 
Thought, n bave seen, has understanding for its goa.l, a:nd by under-
ttmding Ye mean to gra.sp .omething as necessitated "ltbin a system. Tbere 
et moreover, many sub-sy8t.ma of knoYleige, and tberefore understanding 
11 be the greater Insofar a.a one possesses a more inclusive system. DIan-
bArd baa implied that the ulttma.te end of thought, which would bring com-
plete understanding, is a syst&m in which no~iDg would be absent, nothiDg 
ontingent or 8oI"bitrM7. This seems to imply, perhaps, till,t in Blanshardts 
theory there is no place for free rill. This, however, is not the only in-
erpretat.ion that 18 possible. All it need imply is that there is no such 
hing u chance, i.e., all it implies Is the presence of causality for e"'"'.T 
vent. Now such a system, although never realized, is the t~st of aD,. 
That is, any theory that coheres with t.he system of bowleqe, 
d the al1-inol118i.,.. system t.o1t8.rd 'Which "It 1. 'W'Ol"fdng, is true. This 
est, coherence, is also the nature of truth. To say that a proposition 
oherea nth a given system of kn.OYledge is what we mean by truth. It this 
is true, then there are various levels of truth. "A given judgl\tment i8 true 
in tlbe degree tlo Yhich its oontent could l'll&inta.1n itaelf in the light of a 
completed system ot knowledge, talse in the degree to which its appearance 
there would require lt8 tranaformation"(N&ture II. 304}. This calls for 
explanatlion. 
The Coheren •• theory means that all judgements, rather than being ab-
solut.e. are true only in degree. 'rho main grounds for this is psychologi-
cal. In treating the psychological ground, it might be useful to recall tho 
simile we used before. Any 'island' 'Will ha.ve a different meaning and sig-
nif1cation depending upon the 'mainland. that is brought before it. When 
a young boy mak •• the statement tNapoleon lost at waterloo,' "What is it 
emetl,. that be is _.rting? Is what h. u •• rta-that which he take. to 
be true--precisely the same 84 what you or lora historian would be assert-
ing if the ... "r<hl 'WOn a.d' t}uiw clearly it is not.... He may ... y 
that the boy i. refer~ to the same fact as his elde ... and using the same 
'Wor •• and hence must be ..... rtlng tbe same thing. But here the r.lat,lona 
, 
are being confounded between three ditferent'tbing..-what i. technically 
called the metaphyaical subject" th. judgement, t,he judg.ment or proposi-
tion ..... orted, a.nel the wrds in which thi. 18 .xpr •••• r(Xatv. II. lOT). 
iBy the metaphyaical subject i. meant reality-in t,his oue Napele .. ta 
defe.t. The judg.ment 1. tbat which i. cte.lared or meant, the "oru are 
t,h. ny in which tbe" judgement i ...... rted. Now it ..... evident that, the 
met,aphyaical .ubject, 01" hi.toriea1 event, ad the torm of expre.sion may 
be the same tor the school-boy and the hlatorian while the judg.ments are 
poles apart. Renee, they are not. precisely talIdng about the SUJS thing. 
Tbe acute historian may have thousano of sbad •• of meaning attached to bi. 
judgement mUe tbe scboolboy most prob~bly hu in mind a rather picturesque 
batt,le .. ene, glos.ed over 'With childish feelings that, are u peculiarly 
his own u his own person. 1 T 
11Ibid., II, 301-308. 
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But let this 8obool.ooy soan the history books tor a few more years 
and bis 'mainland t rill oonsiden.bly increue in depth and scope-including 
distinctiolUl, implications, o&W1al factor., &I1d motins in hi. judgement 
about Napoleon. In other words ttle 'island t rill begin to take an even 
tal expansion is fitting more details together into a coherent .ub-eystem. 
Eftry tim& the school-boy repeats his juagement about Napoleon, he bas no 
doubt inoreased the meaning-content 1B deeee. NOW' thill tnoreue in degree 
of meaning entaila tbe doctrine that truth 111 .. _tter of dogrees. The 
" "It. melUdngs u actually .. ffirmed we organic to the mind of the thinker, 
, 
and henee • •• the same words ... uttered by different persona or by the same 
person at different time., bear contracted 01" expanded meanings which will 
therefore embody' truth in V&rying dctgree"(N;at~ II. 313). Truth, therefore 
is yon only inaofar as the degre~to whioh ODe'. experience 11 organized 
into a coherent system. If truth ia thought 011 ita wa7 home, then the a-
DlOUDt of tl"Uth one baa is dependent on one's proximity to home, dependat 
on the degree to whiob one haa been able to identify the tmmanent end of 
thought and the tran.cendent end or object of thougbt. 
H. Conclusion 
This consummatos the argument of this the8ia as repre8entative of 
ra.nd Bla.raahard'a theor'y of thought. The attempt haa been made to show boy 
thought 1a 8. teleological process which involves perception. the idea, and 
eflection. We have aeen boy the nature of all tllre. are inextricably bnDl 
p with each other in the knowing process. The main con 01 uion, toward 
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which all the separate treatment. vere a.iming, Y38 that coherence is the 
nature of ftruth as veil as the teat of truth, that truth as coberence i. 
the goal toward which all the knowing processes of ... are moving_ 
J.cm01"ding to Blanahard, then, systematic coherence::, is the end gUiding 
all fthe knowing processes of man. From the very initial atages of perce po-
ftion the ~~se to expand, to &asimilate the alien, to grow into syatem, 
~ incorporate everything, Is present to thought and guides thought. It 
seems elear, tobeD, toilat the entire arg'lllHnft of Blanahard d.~nds upon the 
validity of the goal which he maintains ia implicit to man. 'l'hat is, the 
analysis of per.eption and reflection depend upon s,..tem-eyateUJ6tio coher-
. 
ence-for their va.lidit,.. Insofar as the aaa.lyaia of the goa.l ia nak or 
atroDg, 80 'ttoo will the entire argument be weak or .vong. 
Bluaha.rd has, tlleJl, sta.ked hi8 theory prinCipally upon the coherence 
theory of trutb, .... do not think that t.hiJI tdleor1 hoa been jutified as 
adequately as ift should be. Nor is it at, all clear that coberence has de-
cisively removed 'correspondence with fact' from the field of llOssibilities. 
Indeed, at many point. in the argumenft, Blanah&rd's language and examples 
~eemed to betray a concession to the corresI~ndence theory, rather than to 
ooh .... nce. 'l'be receut discussion ot the sohool-1>o1" a knowledge of NapoIe-
Iont. defeat, for example, proTides WI nth an iruJtance in whioh either co-
~erenc. or correspondenae have equal right. We m.ight say, tha.t in thia 
linatanc., the 80hool-l>o1'·. grea.ter degrees of truth 1rU changed and imp"oved 
~y gre!'.ter and grea.ter oorrespondenoe viftb the fo.eta coneernin.g Napoleon's 
"'.feat. It is not }MIssihle, however, to mainkin that the boy's truth 1t"a8 
...".,ved by correspondence alon~. or e.t I.a.st this ft.Uthor does not think 
so. Ra.ther, it. seema very likel,. tl!t.a.t some of the increue of trutlt 'W'U 
eaused by certain futs cohering rith certa.in other facts. Are we to 8&7 
then, that. truth has a double na.t.ure? It seems to t.hts author that both 
eorrespondence and coherence play important role. tn constituting the ne-
ture of truth. And the difficulty, hero, does not consist so much in dis-
tinguishing tile two, but. in 'seeing' hOW' they are synt.hesized into one ns.-
tttl"e of truth. 
J.ec!ortlini to Dlansbard, the correspondence theory would mainta.in tha.t 
tho correspondence is between the ideal content and sorne 'facta' which _nd 
over &gainst man. But according to an advoe~t.o of the correspondence ~eGi'7t 
this ts not the case. Rather, nen we apeak of agreement or carrespo_ence, 
what. I. meant i. a 'harmony' between knowledge ud the real,18 a certain 
adequati01l ntch Is effected by judgement. What ts not spoken of is a. one-
to-one relation betften kn01fledge and the real, and this seened to be one 
of B1UUlhard's main objection. to the correspondence theory_ Rather, Regis 
somewhat echoes Blaashard's description of the paradoxical character of 
!m01fleclge. .. ••• it haa tYO apparently paradOxical aspecta, t.he first of 
Iwbich is t.he perfect interiorit.y of the aet of Imwledge, and the other, 
even more surprising, the continual inva.sion of this i~no. by outer 
~ealit7 ••• , the invasion and constant occupation of t.he soul by !!!!. ot.her. 
~. called this other ~ obJeot, which Is characterized by belonging atmul-
. 19 taneou.l,. to the exterior a.nd interior wlinr.e." This reminds us of 
. 1~.M. Regis~ E~.temoI51~ translated by Imolda. Choquette Byrne. 
(New York, 1959), p. § • 
19.!2.!!., p. 3OT. 
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Blanshard'. pare.4osa tde& and object. must. corre.p4)nd, but. ca.nnot po.sibly 
cor:resllonel. At least tbey crumot correspond nth a one-to-one relationship. 
Do t.hey correspond, a.a Bla.nl!lhard implies, os tbe potentia.l correspono to 
the e.ctual? Is the idea on the road to becomin, the real? Ind.ed, thls 
la.nguage which Dlanshard uses is subjeet. too many interpretations. It. ts 
vague, but one thing ts qutt.e clear. Blan.hard l~intalns a :reference of 
tbought to thing., to something external and transcendent. Tbus, the co-
herence theory ia certainl,. more thaa internal oons latency. 
Coherence and ~orrespondenc. certainly remain at odds in Dlanabard -8': 
analysis. But., it ia the conviction of this author that they are mutually 
, 
ompatible, each having a place in the nature of truth. Correspondenoe, 
t.his author '''.1411, cannot be separated from coherence, and coherence coa-
ot. be separat.ed from correspondence. One implies the other, or a.t leut 
lmost alW'D.YS. Each is neeessary in discussing truth. Correspondence, in 
the sense of a judgement corresponding with the object, gives one the what, 
ile coherence educes the implication' of the Yhat,streqtbening the valid-
interpreta.tions of t.he ~. Coherence, in other 
rds, provide. us nth a. system of related ~ats, shoYing to na.t degree 
ne object is dependen~ upon, e~U8a.tive of, or related to another object, 
>l"e,.1.el,. becauae tho roa.1 is thus related and intelligible. 
-
This m~,. be ult~tely. an over-eourageous a.ttempt to conciliate tyO 
ncompatible theories. But if eorrespondenco were adequately cla.rified in 
lansh~rd's mind, th.~ theorie. would undoubtedl,. appear most compatible. 
at is unfortunate, it seems to this author, is the fact that philosophi-
al party affiliations ofte. preclude any hope of meeting tho 'other', 
8T 
chiefly because of a name that betokens idealism. rationalism or empiricism 
-one of t.he party tag.. Blansnard rises above the 'tags' of tbe commenta-
to"s and brings a sincere effort to introduce some unity into the nature of 
thought. For this effort, be deservedly ranks among the grea.t philosophers 
of our time. 
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